Abstract:Persuasion games have been fundamental in economics and AI research, and have significant practical applications. Recent works in this area have started to incorporate natural language, moving beyond the traditional stylized message setting. However, previous research has focused on on-policy prediction, where the train and test data have the same distribution, which is not representative of real-life scenarios. In this paper, we tackle the challenging problem of off-policy evaluation (OPE) in language-based persuasion games. To address the inherent difficulty of human data collection in this setup, we propose a novel approach which combines real and simulated human-bot interaction data. Our simulated data is created by an exogenous model assuming decision makers (DMs) start with a mixture of random and decision-theoretic based behaviors and improve over time. We present a deep learning training algorithm that effectively integrates real interaction and simulated data, substantially improving over models that train only with interaction data. Our results demonstrate the potential of real interaction and simulation mixtures as a cost-effective and scalable solution for OPE in language-based persuasion games.\footnote{Our code and the large dataset we collected and generated are submitted as supplementary material and will be made publicly available upon acceptance.
Abstract:We present MeeQA, a dataset for natural-language question answering over meeting transcripts. It includes real questions asked during meetings by its participants. The dataset contains 48K question-answer pairs, extracted from 422 meeting transcripts, spanning multiple domains. Questions in transcripts pose a special challenge as they are not always clear, and considerable context may be required in order to provide an answer. Further, many questions asked during meetings are left unanswered. To improve baseline model performance on this type of questions, we also propose a novel loss function, \emph{Flat Hierarchical Loss}, designed to enhance performance over questions with no answer in the text. Our experiments demonstrate the advantage of using our approach over standard QA models.
Abstract:Persuasion games are fundamental in economics and AI research and serve as the basis for important applications. However, work on this setup assumes communication with stylized messages that do not consist of rich human language. In this paper we consider a repeated sender (expert) -- receiver (decision maker) game, where the sender is fully informed about the state of the world and aims to persuade the receiver to accept a deal by sending one of several possible natural language reviews. We design an automatic expert that plays this repeated game, aiming to achieve the maximal payoff. Our expert is implemented within the Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm, with deep learning models that exploit behavioral and linguistic signals in order to predict the next action of the decision maker, and the future payoff of the expert given the state of the game and a candidate review. We demonstrate the superiority of our expert over strong baselines, its adaptability to different decision makers, and that its selected reviews are nicely adapted to the proposed deal.
Abstract:Sender-receiver interactions, and specifically persuasion games, are widely researched in economic modeling and artificial intelligence, and serve as a solid foundation for powerful applications. However, in the classic persuasion games setting, the messages sent from the expert to the decision-maker are abstract or well-structured application-specific signals rather than natural (human) language messages, although natural language is a very common communication signal in real-world persuasion setups. This paper addresses the use of natural language in persuasion games, exploring its impact on the decisions made by the players and aiming to construct effective models for the prediction of these decisions. For this purpose, we conduct an online repeated interaction experiment. At each trial of the interaction, an informed expert aims to sell an uninformed decision-maker a vacation in a hotel, by sending her a review that describes the hotel. While the expert is exposed to several scored reviews, the decision-maker observes only the single review sent by the expert, and her payoff in case she chooses to take the hotel is a random draw from the review score distribution available to the expert only. The expert's payoff, in turn, depends on the number of times the decision-maker chooses the hotel. We consider a number of modeling approaches for this setup, differing from each other in the model type (deep neural network (DNN) vs. linear classifier), the type of features used by the model (textual, behavioral or both) and the source of the textual features (DNN-based vs. hand-crafted). Our results demonstrate that given a prefix of the interaction sequence, our models can predict the future decisions of the decision-maker, particularly when a sequential modeling approach and hand-crafted textual features are applied.
Abstract:Behavioral decision theories aim to explain human behavior. Can they help predict it? An open tournament for prediction of human choices in fundamental economic decision tasks is presented. The results suggest that integration of certain behavioral theories as features in machine learning systems provides the best predictions. Surprisingly, the most useful theories for prediction build on basic properties of human and animal learning and are very different from mainstream decision theories that focus on deviations from rational choice. Moreover, we find that theoretical features should be based not only on qualitative behavioral insights (e.g. loss aversion), but also on quantitative behavioral foresights generated by functional descriptive models (e.g. Prospect Theory). Our analysis prescribes a recipe for derivation of explainable, useful predictions of human decisions.