Abstract:Although face recognition starts to play an important role in our daily life, we need to pay attention that data-driven face recognition vision systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, the current two categories of adversarial attacks, namely digital attacks and physical attacks both have drawbacks, with the former ones impractical and the latter one conspicuous, high-computational and inexecutable. To address the issues, we propose a practical, executable, inconspicuous and low computational adversarial attack based on LED illumination modulation. To fool the systems, the proposed attack generates imperceptible luminance changes to human eyes through fast intensity modulation of scene LED illumination and uses the rolling shutter effect of CMOS image sensors in face recognition systems to implant luminance information perturbation to the captured face images. In summary,we present a denial-of-service (DoS) attack for face detection and a dodging attack for face verification. We also evaluate their effectiveness against well-known face detection models, Dlib, MTCNN and RetinaFace , and face verification models, Dlib, FaceNet,and ArcFace.The extensive experiments show that the success rates of DoS attacks against face detection models reach 97.67%, 100%, and 100%, respectively, and the success rates of dodging attacks against all face verification models reach 100%.
Abstract:Adversarial attacks can mislead deep learning models to make false predictions by implanting small perturbations to the original input that are imperceptible to the human eye, which poses a huge security threat to the computer vision systems based on deep learning. Physical adversarial attacks, which is more realistic, as the perturbation is introduced to the input before it is being captured and converted to a binary image inside the vision system, when compared to digital adversarial attacks. In this paper, we focus on physical adversarial attacks and further classify them into invasive and non-invasive. Optical-based physical adversarial attack techniques (e.g. using light irradiation) belong to the non-invasive category. As the perturbations can be easily ignored by humans as the perturbations are very similar to the effects generated by a natural environment in the real world. They are highly invisibility and executable and can pose a significant or even lethal threats to real systems. This paper focuses on optical-based physical adversarial attack techniques for computer vision systems, with emphasis on the introduction and discussion of optical-based physical adversarial attack techniques.
Abstract:With the development of machine learning, it is difficult for a single server to process all the data. So machine learning tasks need to be spread across multiple servers, turning the centralized machine learning into a distributed one. However, privacy remains an unsolved problem in distributed machine learning. Multi-key homomorphic encryption is one of the suitable candidates to solve the problem. However, the most recent result of the Multi-key homomorphic encryption scheme (MKTFHE) only supports the NAND gate. Although it is Turing complete, it requires efficient encapsulation of the NAND gate to further support mathematical calculation. This paper designs and implements a series of operations on positive and negative integers accurately. First, we design basic bootstrapped gates with the same efficiency as that of the NAND gate. Second, we construct practical $k$-bit complement mathematical operators based on our basic binary bootstrapped gates. The constructed created can perform addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division on both positive and negative integers. Finally, we demonstrated the generality of the designed operators by achieving a distributed privacy-preserving machine learning algorithm, i.e. linear regression with two different solutions. Experiments show that the operators we designed are practical and efficient.