Infrastructure for AI Agents

Increasingly many AI systems can plan and execute interactions in open-ended environments, such as making phone calls or buying online goods. As developers grow the space of tasks that such AI agents can accomplish, we will need tools both to unlock their benefits and manage their risks. Current tools are largely insufficient because they are not designed to shape how agents interact with existing institutions (e.g., legal and economic systems) or actors (e.g., digital service providers, humans, other AI agents). For example, alignment techniques by nature do not assure counterparties that some human will be held accountable when a user instructs an agent to perform an illegal action. To fill this gap, we propose the concept of agent infrastructure: technical systems and shared protocols external to agents that are designed to mediate and influence their interactions with and impacts on their environments. Agent infrastructure comprises both new tools and reconfigurations or extensions of existing tools. For example, to facilitate accountability, protocols that tie users to agents could build upon existing systems for user authentication, such as OpenID. Just as the Internet relies on infrastructure like HTTPS, we argue that agent infrastructure will be similarly indispensable to ecosystems of agents. We identify three functions for agent infrastructure: 1) attributing actions, properties, and other information to specific agents, their users, or other actors; 2) shaping agents' interactions; and 3) detecting and remedying harmful actions from agents. We propose infrastructure that could help achieve each function, explaining use cases, adoption, limitations, and open questions. Making progress on agent infrastructure can prepare society for the adoption of more advanced agents.

Responsible Reporting for Frontier AI Development

Mitigating the risks from frontier AI systems requires up-to-date and reliable information about those systems. Organizations that develop and deploy frontier systems have significant access to such information. By reporting safety-critical information to actors in government, industry, and civil society, these organizations could improve visibility into new and emerging risks posed by frontier systems. Equipped with this information, developers could make better informed decisions on risk management, while policymakers could design more targeted and robust regulatory infrastructure. We outline the key features of responsible reporting and propose mechanisms for implementing them in practice.

Regulatory Markets: The Future of AI Governance

Appropriately regulating artificial intelligence is an increasingly urgent policy challenge. Legislatures and regulators lack the specialized knowledge required to best translate public demands into legal requirements. Overreliance on industry self-regulation fails to hold producers and users of AI systems accountable to democratic demands. Regulatory markets, in which governments require the targets of regulation to purchase regulatory services from a private regulator, are proposed. This approach to AI regulation could overcome the limitations of both command-and-control regulation and self-regulation. Regulatory market could enable governments to establish policy priorities for the regulation of AI, whilst relying on market forces and industry R&D efforts to pioneer the methods of regulation that best achieve policymakers' stated objectives.

Silly rules improve the capacity of agents to learn stable enforcement and compliance behaviors

How can societies learn to enforce and comply with social norms? Here we investigate the learning dynamics and emergence of compliance and enforcement of social norms in a foraging game, implemented in a multi-agent reinforcement learning setting. In this spatiotemporally extended game, individuals are incentivized to implement complex berry-foraging policies and punish transgressions against social taboos covering specific berry types. We show that agents benefit when eating poisonous berries is taboo, meaning the behavior is punished by other agents, as this helps overcome a credit-assignment problem in discovering delayed health effects. Critically, however, we also show that introducing an additional taboo, which results in punishment for eating a harmless berry, improves the rate and stability with which agents learn to punish taboo violations and comply with taboos. Counterintuitively, our results show that an arbitrary taboo (a "silly rule") can enhance social learning dynamics and achieve better outcomes in the middle stages of learning. We discuss the results in the context of studying normativity as a group-level emergent phenomenon.

Legible Normativity for AI Alignment: The Value of Silly Rules

It has become commonplace to assert that autonomous agents will have to be built to follow human rules of behavior--social norms and laws. But human laws and norms are complex and culturally varied systems, in many cases agents will have to learn the rules. This requires autonomous agents to have models of how human rule systems work so that they can make reliable predictions about rules. In this paper we contribute to the building of such models by analyzing an overlooked distinction between important rules and what we call silly rules--rules with no discernible direct impact on welfare. We show that silly rules render a normative system both more robust and more adaptable in response to shocks to perceived stability. They make normativity more legible for humans, and can increase legibility for AI systems as well. For AI systems to integrate into human normative systems, we suggest, it may be important for them to have models that include representations of silly rules.