Abstract:Machine Learning (ML) algorithms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where a fraction of the training data is manipulated to deliberately degrade the algorithms' performance. Optimal attacks can be formulated as bilevel optimization problems and help to assess their robustness in worst-case scenarios. We show that current approaches, which typically assume that hyperparameters remain constant, lead to an overly pessimistic view of the algorithms' robustness and of the impact of regularization. We propose a novel optimal attack formulation that considers the effect of the attack on the hyperparameters and models the attack as a multiobjective bilevel optimization problem. This allows to formulate optimal attacks, learn hyperparameters and evaluate robustness under worst-case conditions. We apply this attack formulation to several ML classifiers using $L_2$ and $L_1$ regularization. Our evaluation on multiple datasets confirms the limitations of previous strategies and evidences the benefits of using $L_2$ and $L_1$ regularization to dampen the effect of poisoning attacks.
Abstract:Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are mostly reliant on LiDAR sensors which enable spatial perception of their surroundings and help make driving decisions. Recent works demonstrated attacks that aim to hide objects from AV perception, which can result in severe consequences. 3D shadows, are regions void of measurements in 3D point clouds which arise from occlusions of objects in a scene. 3D shadows were proposed as a physical invariant valuable for detecting spoofed or fake objects. In this work, we leverage 3D shadows to locate obstacles that are hidden from object detectors. We achieve this by searching for void regions and locating the obstacles that cause these shadows. Our proposed methodology can be used to detect an object that has been hidden by an adversary as these objects, while hidden from 3D object detectors, still induce shadow artifacts in 3D point clouds, which we use for obstacle detection. We show that using 3D shadows for obstacle detection can achieve high accuracy in matching shadows to their object and provide precise prediction of an obstacle's distance from the ego-vehicle.
Abstract:Deep neural networks have become an integral part of our software infrastructure and are being deployed in many widely-used and safety-critical applications. However, their integration into many systems also brings with it the vulnerability to test time attacks in the form of Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs). UAPs are a class of perturbations that when applied to any input causes model misclassification. Although there is an ongoing effort to defend models against these adversarial attacks, it is often difficult to reconcile the trade-offs in model accuracy and robustness to adversarial attacks. Jacobian regularization has been shown to improve the robustness of models against UAPs, whilst model ensembles have been widely adopted to improve both predictive performance and model robustness. In this work, we propose a novel approach, Jacobian Ensembles-a combination of Jacobian regularization and model ensembles to significantly increase the robustness against UAPs whilst maintaining or improving model accuracy. Our results show that Jacobian Ensembles achieves previously unseen levels of accuracy and robustness, greatly improving over previous methods that tend to skew towards only either accuracy or robustness.
Abstract:Machine learning algorithms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where a fraction of the training data is manipulated to degrade the algorithms' performance. We show that current approaches, which typically assume that regularization hyperparameters remain constant, lead to an overly pessimistic view of the algorithms' robustness and of the impact of regularization. We propose a novel optimal attack formulation that considers the effect of the attack on the hyperparameters, modelling the attack as a \emph{minimax bilevel optimization problem}. This allows to formulate optimal attacks, select hyperparameters and evaluate robustness under worst case conditions. We apply this formulation to logistic regression using $L_2$ regularization, empirically show the limitations of previous strategies and evidence the benefits of using $L_2$ regularization to dampen the effect of poisoning attacks.
Abstract:Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs) are a prominent class of adversarial examples that exploit the systemic vulnerabilities and enable physically realizable and robust attacks against Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). UAPs generalize across many different inputs; this leads to realistic and effective attacks that can be applied at scale. In this paper we propose HyperNeuron, an efficient and scalable algorithm that allows for the real-time detection of UAPs by identifying suspicious neuron hyper-activations. Our results show the effectiveness of HyperNeuron on multiple tasks (image classification, object detection), against a wide variety of universal attacks, and in realistic scenarios, like perceptual ad-blocking and adversarial patches. HyperNeuron is able to simultaneously detect both adversarial mask and patch UAPs with comparable or better performance than existing UAP defenses whilst introducing a significantly reduced latency of only 0.86 milliseconds per image. This suggests that many realistic and practical universal attacks can be reliably mitigated in real-time, which shows promise for the robust deployment of machine learning systems.
Abstract:Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs) are input perturbations that can fool a neural network on large sets of data. They are a class of attacks that represents a significant threat as they facilitate realistic, practical, and low-cost attacks on neural networks. In this work, we derive upper bounds for the effectiveness of UAPs based on norms of data-dependent Jacobians. We empirically verify that Jacobian regularization greatly increases model robustness to UAPs by up to four times whilst maintaining clean performance. Our theoretical analysis also allows us to formulate a metric for the strength of shared adversarial perturbations between pairs of inputs. We apply this metric to benchmark datasets and show that it is highly correlated with the actual observed robustness. This suggests that realistic and practical universal attacks can be reliably mitigated without sacrificing clean accuracy, which shows promise for the robustness of machine learning systems.
Abstract:LiDARs play a critical role in Autonomous Vehicles' (AVs) perception and their safe operations. Recent works have demonstrated that it is possible to spoof LiDAR return signals to elicit fake objects. In this work we demonstrate how the same physical capabilities can be used to mount a new, even more dangerous class of attacks, namely Object Removal Attacks (ORAs). ORAs aim to force 3D object detectors to fail. We leverage the default setting of LiDARs that record a single return signal per direction to perturb point clouds in the region of interest (RoI) of 3D objects. By injecting illegitimate points behind the target object, we effectively shift points away from the target objects' RoIs. Our initial results using a simple random point selection strategy show that the attack is effective in degrading the performance of commonly used 3D object detection models.
Abstract:Neural network compression methods like pruning and quantization are very effective at efficiently deploying Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) on edge devices. However, DNNs remain vulnerable to adversarial examples-inconspicuous inputs that are specifically designed to fool these models. In particular, Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs), are a powerful class of adversarial attacks which create adversarial perturbations that can generalize across a large set of inputs. In this work, we analyze the effect of various compression techniques to UAP attacks, including different forms of pruning and quantization. We test the robustness of compressed models to white-box and transfer attacks, comparing them with their uncompressed counterparts on CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets. Our evaluations reveal clear differences between pruning methods, including Soft Filter and Post-training Pruning. We observe that UAP transfer attacks between pruned and full models are limited, suggesting that the systemic vulnerabilities across these models are different. This finding has practical implications as using different compression techniques can blunt the effectiveness of black-box transfer attacks. We show that, in some scenarios, quantization can produce gradient-masking, giving a false sense of security. Finally, our results suggest that conclusions about the robustness of compressed models to UAP attacks is application dependent, observing different phenomena in the two datasets used in our experiments.
Abstract:Machine Learning (ML) algorithms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where a fraction of the training data can be manipulated to deliberately degrade the algorithms' performance. Optimal poisoning attacks, which can be formulated as bilevel optimisation problems, help to assess the robustness of learning algorithms in worst-case scenarios. However, current attacks against algorithms with hyperparameters typically assume that these hyperparameters are constant and thus ignore the effect the attack has on them. In this paper, we show that this approach leads to an overly pessimistic view of the robustness of the learning algorithms tested. We propose a novel optimal attack formulation that considers the effect of the attack on the hyperparameters by modelling the attack as a multiobjective bilevel optimisation problem. We apply this novel attack formulation to ML classifiers using $L_2$ regularisation and show that, in contrast to results previously reported in the literature, $L_2$ regularisation enhances the stability of the learning algorithms and helps to partially mitigate poisoning attacks. Our empirical evaluation on different datasets confirms the limitations of previous poisoning attack strategies, evidences the benefits of using $L_2$ regularisation to dampen the effect of poisoning attacks and shows that the regularisation hyperparameter increases as more malicious data points are injected in the training dataset.
Abstract:Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) used on image classification tasks such as ImageNet have been shown to be biased towards recognizing textures rather than shapes. Recent work has attempted to alleviate this by augmenting the training dataset with shape-based examples to create Stylized-ImageNet. However, in this paper we show that models trained on this dataset remain vulnerable to Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs). We use UAPs to evaluate and compare the robustness of CNN models with varying degrees of shape-based training. We also find that a posteriori fine-tuning on ImageNet negates features learned from training on Stylized-ImageNet. This study reveals an important limitation and reiterates the need for further research into understanding the robustness of CNNs for visual recognition.