Considerations Influencing Offense-Defense Dynamics From Artificial Intelligence

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies presents profound challenges to societal safety. As AI systems become more capable, accessible, and integrated into critical services, the dual nature of their potential is increasingly clear. While AI can enhance defensive capabilities in areas like threat detection, risk assessment, and automated security operations, it also presents avenues for malicious exploitation and large-scale societal harm, for example through automated influence operations and cyber attacks. Understanding the dynamics that shape AI's capacity to both cause harm and enhance protective measures is essential for informed decision-making regarding the deployment, use, and integration of advanced AI systems. This paper builds on recent work on offense-defense dynamics within the realm of AI, proposing a taxonomy to map and examine the key factors that influence whether AI systems predominantly pose threats or offer protective benefits to society. By establishing a shared terminology and conceptual foundation for analyzing these interactions, this work seeks to facilitate further research and discourse in this critical area.

Implications for Governance in Public Perceptions of Societal-scale AI Risks

Amid growing concerns over AI's societal risks--ranging from civilizational collapse to misinformation and systemic bias--this study explores the perceptions of AI experts and the general US registered voters on the likelihood and impact of 18 specific AI risks, alongside their policy preferences for managing these risks. While both groups favor international oversight over national or corporate governance, our survey reveals a discrepancy: voters perceive AI risks as both more likely and more impactful than experts, and also advocate for slower AI development. Specifically, our findings indicate that policy interventions may best assuage collective concerns if they attempt to more carefully balance mitigation efforts across all classes of societal-scale risks, effectively nullifying the near-vs-long-term debate over AI risks. More broadly, our results will serve not only to enable more substantive policy discussions for preventing and mitigating AI risks, but also to underscore the challenge of consensus building for effective policy implementation.

An International Consortium for Evaluations of Societal-Scale Risks from Advanced AI

Given rapid progress toward advanced AI and risks from frontier AI systems (advanced AI systems pushing the boundaries of the AI capabilities frontier), the creation and implementation of AI governance and regulatory schemes deserves prioritization and substantial investment. However, the status quo is untenable and, frankly, dangerous. A regulatory gap has permitted AI labs to conduct research, development, and deployment activities with minimal oversight. In response, frontier AI system evaluations have been proposed as a way of assessing risks from the development and deployment of frontier AI systems. Yet, the budding AI risk evaluation ecosystem faces significant coordination challenges, such as a limited diversity of evaluators, suboptimal allocation of effort, and perverse incentives. This paper proposes a solution in the form of an international consortium for AI risk evaluations, comprising both AI developers and third-party AI risk evaluators. Such a consortium could play a critical role in international efforts to mitigate societal-scale risks from advanced AI, including in managing responsible scaling policies and coordinated evaluation-based risk response. In this paper, we discuss the current evaluation ecosystem and its shortcomings, propose an international consortium for advanced AI risk evaluations, discuss issues regarding its implementation, discuss lessons that can be learnt from previous international institutions and existing proposals for international AI governance institutions, and, finally, we recommend concrete steps to advance the establishment of the proposed consortium: (i) solicit feedback from stakeholders, (ii) conduct additional research, (iii) conduct a workshop(s) for stakeholders, (iv) analyze feedback and create final proposal, (v) solicit funding, and (vi) create a consortium.