Taking AI Welfare Seriously

In this report, we argue that there is a realistic possibility that some AI systems will be conscious and/or robustly agentic in the near future. That means that the prospect of AI welfare and moral patienthood, i.e. of AI systems with their own interests and moral significance, is no longer an issue only for sci-fi or the distant future. It is an issue for the near future, and AI companies and other actors have a responsibility to start taking it seriously. We also recommend three early steps that AI companies and other actors can take: They can (1) acknowledge that AI welfare is an important and difficult issue (and ensure that language model outputs do the same), (2) start assessing AI systems for evidence of consciousness and robust agency, and (3) prepare policies and procedures for treating AI systems with an appropriate level of moral concern. To be clear, our argument in this report is not that AI systems definitely are, or will be, conscious, robustly agentic, or otherwise morally significant. Instead, our argument is that there is substantial uncertainty about these possibilities, and so we need to improve our understanding of AI welfare and our ability to make wise decisions about this issue. Otherwise there is a significant risk that we will mishandle decisions about AI welfare, mistakenly harming AI systems that matter morally and/or mistakenly caring for AI systems that do not.

Can LLMs make trade-offs involving stipulated pain and pleasure states?

Pleasure and pain play an important role in human decision making by providing a common currency for resolving motivational conflicts. While Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate detailed descriptions of pleasure and pain experiences, it is an open question whether LLMs can recreate the motivational force of pleasure and pain in choice scenarios - a question which may bear on debates about LLM sentience, understood as the capacity for valenced experiential states. We probed this question using a simple game in which the stated goal is to maximise points, but where either the points-maximising option is said to incur a pain penalty or a non-points-maximising option is said to incur a pleasure reward, providing incentives to deviate from points-maximising behaviour. Varying the intensity of the pain penalties and pleasure rewards, we found that Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Command R+, GPT-4o, and GPT-4o mini each demonstrated at least one trade-off in which the majority of responses switched from points-maximisation to pain-minimisation or pleasure-maximisation after a critical threshold of stipulated pain or pleasure intensity is reached. LLaMa 3.1-405b demonstrated some graded sensitivity to stipulated pleasure rewards and pain penalties. Gemini 1.5 Pro and PaLM 2 prioritised pain-avoidance over points-maximisation regardless of intensity, while tending to prioritise points over pleasure regardless of intensity. We discuss the implications of these findings for debates about the possibility of LLM sentience.

Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.