Deflating Deflationism: A Critical Perspective on Debunking Arguments Against LLM Mentality

Many people feel compelled to interpret, describe, and respond to Large Language Models (LLMs) as if they possess inner mental lives similar to our own. Responses to this phenomenon have varied. Inflationists hold that at least some folk psychological ascriptions to LLMs are warranted. Deflationists argue that all such attributions of mentality to LLMs are misplaced, often cautioning against the risk that anthropomorphic projection may lead to misplaced trust or potentially even confusion about the moral status of LLMs. We advance this debate by assessing two common deflationary arguments against LLM mentality. What we term the 'robustness strategy' aims to undercut one justification for believing that LLMs are minded entities by showing that putatively cognitive and humanlike behaviours are not robust, failing to generalise appropriately. What we term the 'etiological strategy' undercuts attributions of mentality by challenging naive causal explanations of LLM behaviours, offering alternative causal accounts that weaken the case for mental state attributions. While both strategies offer powerful challenges to full-blown inflationism, we find that neither strategy provides a knock-down case against ascriptions of mentality to LLMs simpliciter. With this in mind, we explore a modest form of inflationism that permits ascriptions of mentality to LLMs under certain conditions. Specifically, we argue that folk practice provides a defeasible basis for attributing mental states and capacities to LLMs provided those mental states and capacities can be understood in metaphysically undemanding terms (e.g. knowledge, beliefs and desires), while greater caution is required when attributing metaphysically demanding mental phenomena such as phenomenal consciousness.

Can LLMs make trade-offs involving stipulated pain and pleasure states?

Pleasure and pain play an important role in human decision making by providing a common currency for resolving motivational conflicts. While Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate detailed descriptions of pleasure and pain experiences, it is an open question whether LLMs can recreate the motivational force of pleasure and pain in choice scenarios - a question which may bear on debates about LLM sentience, understood as the capacity for valenced experiential states. We probed this question using a simple game in which the stated goal is to maximise points, but where either the points-maximising option is said to incur a pain penalty or a non-points-maximising option is said to incur a pleasure reward, providing incentives to deviate from points-maximising behaviour. Varying the intensity of the pain penalties and pleasure rewards, we found that Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Command R+, GPT-4o, and GPT-4o mini each demonstrated at least one trade-off in which the majority of responses switched from points-maximisation to pain-minimisation or pleasure-maximisation after a critical threshold of stipulated pain or pleasure intensity is reached. LLaMa 3.1-405b demonstrated some graded sensitivity to stipulated pleasure rewards and pain penalties. Gemini 1.5 Pro and PaLM 2 prioritised pain-avoidance over points-maximisation regardless of intensity, while tending to prioritise points over pleasure regardless of intensity. We discuss the implications of these findings for debates about the possibility of LLM sentience.

On the attribution of confidence to large language models

Credences are mental states corresponding to degrees of confidence in propositions. Attribution of credences to Large Language Models (LLMs) is commonplace in the empirical literature on LLM evaluation. Yet the theoretical basis for LLM credence attribution is unclear. We defend three claims. First, our semantic claim is that LLM credence attributions are (at least in general) correctly interpreted literally, as expressing truth-apt beliefs on the part of scientists that purport to describe facts about LLM credences. Second, our metaphysical claim is that the existence of LLM credences is at least plausible, although current evidence is inconclusive. Third, our epistemic claim is that LLM credence attributions made in the empirical literature on LLM evaluation are subject to non-trivial sceptical concerns. It is a distinct possibility that even if LLMs have credences, LLM credence attributions are generally false because the experimental techniques used to assess LLM credences are not truth-tracking.

LLMs achieve adult human performance on higher-order theory of mind tasks

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

LLM Theory of Mind and Alignment: Opportunities and Risks

Large language models (LLMs) are transforming human-computer interaction and conceptions of artificial intelligence (AI) with their impressive capacities for conversing and reasoning in natural language. There is growing interest in whether LLMs have theory of mind (ToM); the ability to reason about the mental and emotional states of others that is core to human social intelligence. As LLMs are integrated into the fabric of our personal, professional and social lives and given greater agency to make decisions with real-world consequences, there is a critical need to understand how they can be aligned with human values. ToM seems to be a promising direction of inquiry in this regard. Following the literature on the role and impacts of human ToM, this paper identifies key areas in which LLM ToM will show up in human:LLM interactions at individual and group levels, and what opportunities and risks for alignment are raised in each. On the individual level, the paper considers how LLM ToM might manifest in goal specification, conversational adaptation, empathy and anthropomorphism. On the group level, it considers how LLM ToM might facilitate collective alignment, cooperation or competition, and moral judgement-making. The paper lays out a broad spectrum of potential implications and suggests the most pressing areas for future research.