Abstract:In the context of machine unlearning, the primary challenge lies in effectively removing traces of private data from trained models while maintaining model performance and security against privacy attacks like membership inference attacks. Traditional gradient-based unlearning methods often rely on extensive historical gradients, which becomes impractical with high unlearning ratios and may reduce the effectiveness of unlearning. Addressing these limitations, we introduce Mini-Unlearning, a novel approach that capitalizes on a critical observation: unlearned parameters correlate with retrained parameters through contraction mapping. Our method, Mini-Unlearning, utilizes a minimal subset of historical gradients and leverages this contraction mapping to facilitate scalable, efficient unlearning. This lightweight, scalable method significantly enhances model accuracy and strengthens resistance to membership inference attacks. Our experiments demonstrate that Mini-Unlearning not only works under higher unlearning ratios but also outperforms existing techniques in both accuracy and security, offering a promising solution for applications requiring robust unlearning capabilities.
Abstract:Gradient leakage has been identified as a potential source of privacy breaches in modern image processing systems, where the adversary can completely reconstruct the training images from leaked gradients. However, existing methods are restricted to reconstructing low-resolution images where data leakage risks of image processing systems are not sufficiently explored. In this paper, by exploiting diffusion models, we propose an innovative gradient-guided fine-tuning method and introduce a new reconstruction attack that is capable of stealing private, high-resolution images from image processing systems through leaked gradients where severe data leakage encounters. Our attack method is easy to implement and requires little prior knowledge. The experimental results indicate that current reconstruction attacks can steal images only up to a resolution of $128 \times 128$ pixels, while our attack method can successfully recover and steal images with resolutions up to $512 \times 512$ pixels. Our attack method significantly outperforms the SOTA attack baselines in terms of both pixel-wise accuracy and time efficiency of image reconstruction. Furthermore, our attack can render differential privacy ineffective to some extent.