Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce responses that exhibit social biases and support stereotypes. However, conventional benchmarking is insufficient to thoroughly evaluate LLM bias, as it can not scale to large sets of prompts and provides no guarantees. Therefore, we propose a novel certification framework QuaCer-B (Quantitative Certification of Bias) that provides formal guarantees on obtaining unbiased responses from target LLMs under large sets of prompts. A certificate consists of high-confidence bounds on the probability of obtaining biased responses from the LLM for any set of prompts containing sensitive attributes, sampled from a distribution. We illustrate the bias certification in LLMs for prompts with various prefixes drawn from given distributions. We consider distributions of random token sequences, mixtures of manual jailbreaks, and jailbreaks in the LLM's embedding space to certify its bias. We certify popular LLMs with QuaCer-B and present novel insights into their biases.
Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on several benchmarks. However, traditional studies do not provide formal guarantees on the performance of LLMs. In this work, we propose a novel certification framework for LLM, QuaCer-C, wherein we formally certify the knowledge-comprehension capabilities of popular LLMs. Our certificates are quantitative - they consist of high-confidence, tight bounds on the probability that the target LLM gives the correct answer on any relevant knowledge comprehension prompt. Our certificates for the Llama, Vicuna, and Mistral LLMs indicate that the knowledge comprehension capability improves with an increase in the number of parameters and that the Mistral model is less performant than the rest in this evaluation.
Abstract:With the recent surge in popularity of LLMs has come an ever-increasing need for LLM safety training. In this paper, we show that SOTA open-source LLMs are vulnerable to simple, optimization-free attacks we refer to as $\textit{priming attacks}$, which are easy to execute and effectively bypass alignment from safety training. Our proposed attack improves the Attack Success Rate on Harmful Behaviors, as measured by Llama Guard, by up to $3.3\times$ compared to baselines. Source code and data are available at https://github.com/uiuc-focal-lab/llm-priming-attacks .
Abstract:ML-based program cost models have been shown to yield highly accurate predictions. They have the capability to replace heavily-engineered analytical program cost models in mainstream compilers, but their black-box nature discourages their adoption. In this work, we propose the first method for obtaining faithful and intuitive explanations for the throughput predictions made by ML-based cost models. We demonstrate our explanations for the state-of-the-art ML-based cost model, Ithemal. We compare the explanations for Ithemal with the explanations for a hand-crafted, accurate analytical model, uiCA. Our empirical findings show that high similarity between explanations for Ithemal and uiCA usually corresponds to high similarity between their predictions.