Automatically Detecting Online Deceptive Patterns in Real-time

Deceptive patterns (DPs) in digital interfaces manipulate users into making unintended decisions, exploiting cognitive biases and psychological vulnerabilities. These patterns have become ubiquitous across various digital platforms. While efforts to mitigate DPs have emerged from legal and technical perspectives, a significant gap in usable solutions that empower users to identify and make informed decisions about DPs in real-time remains. In this work, we introduce AutoBot, an automated, deceptive pattern detector that analyzes websites' visual appearances using machine learning techniques to identify and notify users of DPs in real-time. AutoBot employs a two-staged pipeline that processes website screenshots, identifying interactable elements and extracting textual features without relying on HTML structure. By leveraging a custom language model, AutoBot understands the context surrounding these elements to determine the presence of deceptive patterns. We implement AutoBot as a lightweight Chrome browser extension that performs all analyses locally, minimizing latency and preserving user privacy. Through extensive evaluation, we demonstrate AutoBot's effectiveness in enhancing users' ability to navigate digital environments safely while providing a valuable tool for regulators to assess and enforce compliance with DP regulations.

Pipe Overflow: Smashing Voice Authentication for Fun and Profit

Recent years have seen a surge of popularity of acoustics-enabled personal devices powered by machine learning. Yet, machine learning has proven to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. Large number of modern systems protect themselves against such attacks by targeting the artificiality, i.e., they deploy mechanisms to detect the lack of human involvement in generating the adversarial examples. However, these defenses implicitly assume that humans are incapable of producing meaningful and targeted adversarial examples. In this paper, we show that this base assumption is wrong. In particular, we demonstrate that for tasks like speaker identification, a human is capable of producing analog adversarial examples directly with little cost and supervision: by simply speaking through a tube, an adversary reliably impersonates other speakers in eyes of ML models for speaker identification. Our findings extend to a range of other acoustic-biometric tasks such as liveness, bringing into question their use in security-critical settings in real life, such as phone banking.