Automatically Detecting Online Deceptive Patterns in Real-time

Deceptive patterns (DPs) in digital interfaces manipulate users into making unintended decisions, exploiting cognitive biases and psychological vulnerabilities. These patterns have become ubiquitous across various digital platforms. While efforts to mitigate DPs have emerged from legal and technical perspectives, a significant gap in usable solutions that empower users to identify and make informed decisions about DPs in real-time remains. In this work, we introduce AutoBot, an automated, deceptive pattern detector that analyzes websites' visual appearances using machine learning techniques to identify and notify users of DPs in real-time. AutoBot employs a two-staged pipeline that processes website screenshots, identifying interactable elements and extracting textual features without relying on HTML structure. By leveraging a custom language model, AutoBot understands the context surrounding these elements to determine the presence of deceptive patterns. We implement AutoBot as a lightweight Chrome browser extension that performs all analyses locally, minimizing latency and preserving user privacy. Through extensive evaluation, we demonstrate AutoBot's effectiveness in enhancing users' ability to navigate digital environments safely while providing a valuable tool for regulators to assess and enforce compliance with DP regulations.

Honor Among Bandits: No-Regret Learning for Online Fair Division

We consider the problem of online fair division of indivisible goods to players when there are a finite number of types of goods and player values are drawn from distributions with unknown means. Our goal is to maximize social welfare subject to allocating the goods fairly in expectation. When a player's value for an item is unknown at the time of allocation, we show that this problem reduces to a variant of (stochastic) multi-armed bandits, where there exists an arm for each player's value for each type of good. At each time step, we choose a distribution over arms which determines how the next item is allocated. We consider two sets of fairness constraints for this problem: envy-freeness in expectation and proportionality in expectation. Our main result is the design of an explore-then-commit algorithm that achieves $\tilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret while maintaining either fairness constraint. This result relies on unique properties fundamental to fair-division constraints that allow faster rates of learning, despite the restricted action space.

The Distortion of Binomial Voting Defies Expectation

In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome. This concept has been investigated extensively, but only through a worst-case lens. Instead, we study the expected distortion of voting rules with respect to an underlying distribution over voter utilities. Our main contribution is the design and analysis of a novel and intuitive rule, binomial voting, which provides strong expected distortion guarantees for all distributions.