Algorithmic Fairness in Performative Policy Learning: Escaping the Impossibility of Group Fairness

In many prediction problems, the predictive model affects the distribution of the prediction target. This phenomenon is known as performativity and is often caused by the behavior of individuals with vested interests in the outcome of the predictive model. Although performativity is generally problematic because it manifests as distribution shifts, we develop algorithmic fairness practices that leverage performativity to achieve stronger group fairness guarantees in social classification problems (compared to what is achievable in non-performative settings). In particular, we leverage the policymaker's ability to steer the population to remedy inequities in the long term. A crucial benefit of this approach is that it is possible to resolve the incompatibilities between conflicting group fairness definitions.

A statistical framework for weak-to-strong generalization

Modern large language model (LLM) alignment techniques rely on human feedback, but it is unclear whether the techniques fundamentally limit the capabilities of aligned LLMs. In particular, it is unclear whether it is possible to align (stronger) LLMs with superhuman capabilities with (weaker) human feedback without degrading their capabilities. This is an instance of the weak-to-strong generalization problem: using weaker (less capable) feedback to train a stronger (more capable) model. We prove that weak-to-strong generalization is possible by eliciting latent knowledge from pre-trained LLMs. In particular, we cast the weak-to-strong generalization problem as a transfer learning problem in which we wish to transfer a latent concept from a weak model to a strong pre-trained model. We prove that a naive fine-tuning approach suffers from fundamental limitations, but an alternative refinement-based approach suggested by the problem structure provably overcomes the limitations of fine-tuning. Finally, we demonstrate the practical applicability of the refinement approach with three LLM alignment tasks.

Learning In Reverse Causal Strategic Environments With Ramifications on Two Sided Markets

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.