Abstract:In this paper, the method of gaps, a technique for deriving closed-form expressions in terms of information measures for the generalization error of machine learning algorithms is introduced. The method relies on two central observations: $(a)$~The generalization error is an average of the variation of the expected empirical risk with respect to changes on the probability measure (used for expectation); and~$(b)$~these variations, also referred to as gaps, exhibit closed-form expressions in terms of information measures. The expectation of the empirical risk can be either with respect to a measure on the models (with a fixed dataset) or with respect to a measure on the datasets (with a fixed model), which results in two variants of the method of gaps. The first variant, which focuses on the gaps of the expected empirical risk with respect to a measure on the models, appears to be the most general, as no assumptions are made on the distribution of the datasets. The second variant develops under the assumption that datasets are made of independent and identically distributed data points. All existing exact expressions for the generalization error of machine learning algorithms can be obtained with the proposed method. Also, this method allows obtaining numerous new exact expressions, which improves the understanding of the generalization error; establish connections with other areas in statistics, e.g., hypothesis testing; and potentially, might guide algorithm designs.
Abstract:The effect of relative entropy asymmetry is analyzed in the context of empirical risk minimization (ERM) with relative entropy regularization (ERM-RER). Two regularizations are considered: $(a)$ the relative entropy of the measure to be optimized with respect to a reference measure (Type-I ERM-RER); or $(b)$ the relative entropy of the reference measure with respect to the measure to be optimized (Type-II ERM-RER). The main result is the characterization of the solution to the Type-II ERM-RER problem and its key properties. By comparing the well-understood Type-I ERM-RER with Type-II ERM-RER, the effects of entropy asymmetry are highlighted. The analysis shows that in both cases, regularization by relative entropy forces the solution's support to collapse into the support of the reference measure, introducing a strong inductive bias that can overshadow the evidence provided by the training data. Finally, it is shown that Type-II regularization is equivalent to Type-I regularization with an appropriate transformation of the empirical risk function.
Abstract:The solution to empirical risk minimization with $f$-divergence regularization (ERM-$f$DR) is presented under mild conditions on $f$. Under such conditions, the optimal measure is shown to be unique. Examples of the solution for particular choices of the function $f$ are presented. Previously known solutions to common regularization choices are obtained by leveraging the flexibility of the family of $f$-divergences. These include the unique solutions to empirical risk minimization with relative entropy regularization (Type-I and Type-II). The analysis of the solution unveils the following properties of $f$-divergences when used in the ERM-$f$DR problem: $i\bigl)$ $f$-divergence regularization forces the support of the solution to coincide with the support of the reference measure, which introduces a strong inductive bias that dominates the evidence provided by the training data; and $ii\bigl)$ any $f$-divergence regularization is equivalent to a different $f$-divergence regularization with an appropriate transformation of the empirical risk function.
Abstract:In this paper, the worst-case probability measure over the data is introduced as a tool for characterizing the generalization capabilities of machine learning algorithms. More specifically, the worst-case probability measure is a Gibbs probability measure and the unique solution to the maximization of the expected loss under a relative entropy constraint with respect to a reference probability measure. Fundamental generalization metrics, such as the sensitivity of the expected loss, the sensitivity of the empirical risk, and the generalization gap are shown to have closed-form expressions involving the worst-case data-generating probability measure. Existing results for the Gibbs algorithm, such as characterizing the generalization gap as a sum of mutual information and lautum information, up to a constant factor, are recovered. A novel parallel is established between the worst-case data-generating probability measure and the Gibbs algorithm. Specifically, the Gibbs probability measure is identified as a fundamental commonality of the model space and the data space for machine learning algorithms.
Abstract:The dependence on training data of the Gibbs algorithm (GA) is analytically characterized. By adopting the expected empirical risk as the performance metric, the sensitivity of the GA is obtained in closed form. In this case, sensitivity is the performance difference with respect to an arbitrary alternative algorithm. This description enables the development of explicit expressions involving the training errors and test errors of GAs trained with different datasets. Using these tools, dataset aggregation is studied and different figures of merit to evaluate the generalization capabilities of GAs are introduced. For particular sizes of such datasets and parameters of the GAs, a connection between Jeffrey's divergence, training and test errors is established.
Abstract:The effect of the relative entropy asymmetry is analyzed in the empirical risk minimization with relative entropy regularization (ERM-RER) problem. A novel regularization is introduced, coined Type-II regularization, that allows for solutions to the ERM-RER problem with a support that extends outside the support of the reference measure. The solution to the new ERM-RER Type-II problem is analytically characterized in terms of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the reference measure with respect to the solution. The analysis of the solution unveils the following properties of relative entropy when it acts as a regularizer in the ERM-RER problem: i) relative entropy forces the support of the Type-II solution to collapse into the support of the reference measure, which introduces a strong inductive bias that dominates the evidence provided by the training data; ii) Type-II regularization is equivalent to classical relative entropy regularization with an appropriate transformation of the empirical risk function. Closed-form expressions of the expected empirical risk as a function of the regularization parameters are provided.
Abstract:The empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem with relative entropy regularization (ERM-RER) is investigated under the assumption that the reference measure is a~$\sigma$-finite measure instead of a probability measure. This assumption leads to a generalization of the ERM-RER (g-ERM-RER) problem that allows for a larger degree of flexibility in the incorporation of prior knowledge over the set of models. The solution of the g-ERM-RER problem is shown to be a unique probability measure mutually absolutely continuous with the reference measure and to exhibit a probably-approximately-correct (PAC) guarantee for the ERM problem. For a given dataset, the empirical risk is shown to be a sub-Gaussian random variable when the models are sampled from the solution to the g-ERM-RER problem. Finally, the sensitivity of the expected empirical risk to deviations from the solution of the g-ERM-RER problem is studied. In particular, the expectation of the absolute value of sensitivity is shown to be upper bounded, up to a constant factor, by the square root of the lautum information between the models and the datasets.
Abstract:In this paper, $2 \times 2$ zero-sum games (ZSGs) are studied under the following assumptions: (1) One of the players (the leader) publicly and irrevocably commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy);(2) The leader announces its action, which is observed by its opponent (the follower) through a binary channel; and (3) the follower chooses its strategy based on the knowledge of the leader's strategy and the noisy observation of the leader's action. Under these conditions, the equilibrium is shown to always exist and be often different from the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. Even subject to noise, observing the actions of the leader is either beneficial or immaterial to the follower for all possible commitments. When the commitment is observed subject to a distortion, the equilibrium does not necessarily exist. Nonetheless, the leader might still obtain some benefit in some specific cases subject to equilibrium refinements. For instance, $\epsilon$-equilibria might exist in which the leader commits to suboptimal strategies that allow unequivocally predicting the best response of its opponent.
Abstract:The optimality and sensitivity of the empirical risk minimization problem with relative entropy regularization (ERM-RER) are investigated for the case in which the reference is a sigma-finite measure instead of a probability measure. This generalization allows for a larger degree of flexibility in the incorporation of prior knowledge over the set of models. In this setting, the interplay of the regularization parameter, the reference measure, the risk function, and the empirical risk induced by the solution of the ERM-RER problem is characterized. This characterization yields necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a regularization parameter that achieves an arbitrarily small empirical risk with arbitrarily high probability. The sensitivity of the expected empirical risk to deviations from the solution of the ERM-RER problem is studied. The sensitivity is then used to provide upper and lower bounds on the expected empirical risk. Moreover, it is shown that the expectation of the sensitivity is upper bounded, up to a constant factor, by the square root of the lautum information between the models and the datasets.
Abstract:In this paper, we address the problem of global transmit power minimization in a self-congiguring network where radio devices are subject to operate at a minimum signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) level. We model the network as a parallel Gaussian interference channel and we introduce a fully decentralized algorithm (based on trial and error) able to statistically achieve a congiguration where the performance demands are met. Contrary to existing solutions, our algorithm requires only local information and can learn stable and efficient working points by using only one bit feedback. We model the network under two different game theoretical frameworks: normal form and satisfaction form. We show that the converging points correspond to equilibrium points, namely Nash and satisfaction equilibrium. Similarly, we provide sufficient conditions for the algorithm to converge in both formulations. Moreover, we provide analytical results to estimate the algorithm's performance, as a function of the network parameters. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our theoretical conclusions. Keywords: Learning, power control, trial and error, Nash equilibrium, spectrum sharing.