Abstract:The training phase of machine learning models is a delicate step, especially in cybersecurity contexts. Recent research has surfaced a series of insidious training-time attacks that inject backdoors in models designed for security classification tasks without altering the training labels. With this work, we propose new techniques that leverage insights in cybersecurity threat models to effectively mitigate these clean-label poisoning attacks, while preserving the model utility. By performing density-based clustering on a carefully chosen feature subspace, and progressively isolating the suspicious clusters through a novel iterative scoring procedure, our defensive mechanism can mitigate the attacks without requiring many of the common assumptions in the existing backdoor defense literature. To show the generality of our proposed mitigation, we evaluate it on two clean-label model-agnostic attacks on two different classic cybersecurity data modalities: network flows classification and malware classification, using gradient boosting and neural network models.
Abstract:As machine learning (ML) classifiers increasingly oversee the automated monitoring of network traffic, studying their resilience against adversarial attacks becomes critical. This paper focuses on poisoning attacks, specifically backdoor attacks, against network traffic flow classifiers. We investigate the challenging scenario of clean-label poisoning where the adversary's capabilities are constrained to tampering only with the training data - without the ability to arbitrarily modify the training labels or any other component of the training process. We describe a trigger crafting strategy that leverages model interpretability techniques to generate trigger patterns that are effective even at very low poisoning rates. Finally, we design novel strategies to generate stealthy triggers, including an approach based on generative Bayesian network models, with the goal of minimizing the conspicuousness of the trigger, and thus making detection of an ongoing poisoning campaign more challenging. Our findings provide significant insights into the feasibility of poisoning attacks on network traffic classifiers used in multiple scenarios, including detecting malicious communication and application classification.
Abstract:The cyber-threat landscape has evolved tremendously in recent years, with new threat variants emerging daily, and large-scale coordinated campaigns becoming more prevalent. In this study, we propose CELEST (CollaborativE LEarning for Scalable Threat detection), a federated machine learning framework for global threat detection over HTTP, which is one of the most commonly used protocols for malware dissemination and communication. CELEST leverages federated learning in order to collaboratively train a global model across multiple clients who keep their data locally, thus providing increased privacy and confidentiality assurances. Through a novel active learning component integrated with the federated learning technique, our system continuously discovers and learns the behavior of new, evolving, and globally-coordinated cyber threats. We show that CELEST is able to expose attacks that are largely invisible to individual organizations. For instance, in one challenging attack scenario with data exfiltration malware, the global model achieves a three-fold increase in Precision-Recall AUC compared to the local model. We deploy CELEST on two university networks and show that it is able to detect the malicious HTTP communication with high precision and low false positive rates. Furthermore, during its deployment, CELEST detected a set of previously unknown 42 malicious URLs and 20 malicious domains in one day, which were confirmed to be malicious by VirusTotal.
Abstract:Machine learning (ML) started to become widely deployed in cyber security settings for shortening the detection cycle of cyber attacks. To date, most ML-based systems are either proprietary or make specific choices of feature representations and machine learning models. The success of these techniques is difficult to assess as public benchmark datasets are currently unavailable. In this paper, we provide concrete guidelines and recommendations for using supervised ML in cyber security. As a case study, we consider the problem of botnet detection from network traffic data. Among our findings we highlight that: (1) feature representations should take into consideration attack characteristics; (2) ensemble models are well-suited to handle class imbalance; (3) the granularity of ground truth plays an important role in the success of these methods.