Geospatial Trajectory Generation via Efficient Abduction: Deployment for Independent Testing

The ability to generate artificial human movement patterns while meeting location and time constraints is an important problem in the security community, particularly as it enables the study of the analog problem of detecting such patterns while maintaining privacy. We frame this problem as an instance of abduction guided by a novel parsimony function represented as an aggregate truth value over an annotated logic program. This approach has the added benefit of affording explainability to an analyst user. By showing that any subset of such a program can provide a lower bound on this parsimony requirement, we are able to abduce movement trajectories efficiently through an informed (i.e., A*) search. We describe how our implementation was enhanced with the application of multiple techniques in order to be scaled and integrated with a cloud-based software stack that included bottom-up rule learning, geolocated knowledge graph retrieval/management, and interfaces with government systems for independently conducted government-run tests for which we provide results. We also report on our own experiments showing that we not only provide exact results but also scale to very large scenarios and provide realistic agent trajectories that can go undetected by machine learning anomaly detectors.

Analyzing the Perceived Severity of Cybersecurity Threats Reported on Social Media

Breaking cybersecurity events are shared across a range of websites, including security blogs (FireEye, Kaspersky, etc.), in addition to social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. In this paper, we investigate methods to analyze the severity of cybersecurity threats based on the language that is used to describe them online. A corpus of 6,000 tweets describing software vulnerabilities is annotated with authors' opinions toward their severity. We show that our corpus supports the development of automatic classifiers with high precision for this task. Furthermore, we demonstrate the value of analyzing users' opinions about the severity of threats reported online as an early indicator of important software vulnerabilities. We present a simple, yet effective method for linking software vulnerabilities reported in tweets to Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Using our predicted severity scores, we show that it is possible to achieve a Precision@50 of 0.86 when forecasting high severity vulnerabilities, significantly outperforming a baseline that is based on tweet volume. Finally we show how reports of severe vulnerabilities online are predictive of real-world exploits.