LongRoPE2: Near-Lossless LLM Context Window Scaling

LongRoPE2 is a novel approach that extends the effective context window of pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to the target length, while preserving the performance on the original shorter context window. This is achieved by three contributions: (1) a hypothesis that insufficient training in higher RoPE dimensions contributes to the persistent out-of-distribution (OOD) issues observed in existing methods; (2) an effective RoPE rescaling algorithm that adopts evolutionary search guided by "needle-driven" perplexity to address the insufficient training problem; (3) a mixed context window training approach that fine-tunes model weights to adopt rescaled RoPE for long-context sequences while preserving the short-context performance with the original RoPE. Extensive experiments on LLaMA3-8B and Phi3-mini-3.8B across various benchmarks validate the hypothesis and demonstrate the effectiveness of LongRoPE2. Remarkably, LongRoPE2 extends LLaMA3-8B to achieve a 128K effective context length while retaining over 98.5% of short-context performance, using only 10B tokens -- 80x fewer than Meta's approach, which fails to reach the target effective context length. Code will be available at https://github.com/microsoft/LongRoPE.

Stochastic Monkeys at Play: Random Augmentations Cheaply Break LLM Safety Alignment

Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has recently become a critical objective of model developers. In response, a growing body of work has been investigating how safety alignment can be bypassed through various jailbreaking methods, such as adversarial attacks. However, these jailbreak methods can be rather costly or involve a non-trivial amount of creativity and effort, introducing the assumption that malicious users are high-resource or sophisticated. In this paper, we study how simple random augmentations to the input prompt affect safety alignment effectiveness in state-of-the-art LLMs, such as Llama 3 and Qwen 2. We perform an in-depth evaluation of 17 different models and investigate the intersection of safety under random augmentations with multiple dimensions: augmentation type, model size, quantization, fine-tuning-based defenses, and decoding strategies (e.g., sampling temperature). We show that low-resource and unsophisticated attackers, i.e. $\textit{stochastic monkeys}$, can significantly improve their chances of bypassing alignment with just 25 random augmentations per prompt.