Impact of architecture on robustness and interpretability of multispectral deep neural networks

Including information from additional spectral bands (e.g., near-infrared) can improve deep learning model performance for many vision-oriented tasks. There are many possible ways to incorporate this additional information into a deep learning model, but the optimal fusion strategy has not yet been determined and can vary between applications. At one extreme, known as "early fusion," additional bands are stacked as extra channels to obtain an input image with more than three channels. At the other extreme, known as "late fusion," RGB and non-RGB bands are passed through separate branches of a deep learning model and merged immediately before a final classification or segmentation layer. In this work, we characterize the performance of a suite of multispectral deep learning models with different fusion approaches, quantify their relative reliance on different input bands and evaluate their robustness to naturalistic image corruptions affecting one or more input channels.

Quantifying the robustness of deep multispectral segmentation models against natural perturbations and data poisoning

In overhead image segmentation tasks, including additional spectral bands beyond the traditional RGB channels can improve model performance. However, it is still unclear how incorporating this additional data impacts model robustness to adversarial attacks and natural perturbations. For adversarial robustness, the additional information could improve the model's ability to distinguish malicious inputs, or simply provide new attack avenues and vulnerabilities. For natural perturbations, the additional information could better inform model decisions and weaken perturbation effects or have no significant influence at all. In this work, we seek to characterize the performance and robustness of a multispectral (RGB and near infrared) image segmentation model subjected to adversarial attacks and natural perturbations. While existing adversarial and natural robustness research has focused primarily on digital perturbations, we prioritize on creating realistic perturbations designed with physical world conditions in mind. For adversarial robustness, we focus on data poisoning attacks whereas for natural robustness, we focus on extending ImageNet-C common corruptions for fog and snow that coherently and self-consistently perturbs the input data. Overall, we find both RGB and multispectral models are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks regardless of input or fusion architectures and that while physically realizable natural perturbations still degrade model performance, the impact differs based on fusion architecture and input data.

How many dimensions are required to find an adversarial example?

Past work exploring adversarial vulnerability have focused on situations where an adversary can perturb all dimensions of model input. On the other hand, a range of recent works consider the case where either (i) an adversary can perturb a limited number of input parameters or (ii) a subset of modalities in a multimodal problem. In both of these cases, adversarial examples are effectively constrained to a subspace $V$ in the ambient input space $\mathcal{X}$. Motivated by this, in this work we investigate how adversarial vulnerability depends on $\dim(V)$. In particular, we show that the adversarial success of standard PGD attacks with $\ell^p$ norm constraints behaves like a monotonically increasing function of $\epsilon (\frac{\dim(V)}{\dim \mathcal{X}})^{\frac{1}{q}}$ where $\epsilon$ is the perturbation budget and $\frac{1}{p} + \frac{1}{q} =1$, provided $p > 1$ (the case $p=1$ presents additional subtleties which we analyze in some detail). This functional form can be easily derived from a simple toy linear model, and as such our results land further credence to arguments that adversarial examples are endemic to locally linear models on high dimensional spaces.

Convolutional networks inherit frequency sensitivity from image statistics

It is widely acknowledged that trained convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have different levels of sensitivity to signals of different frequency. In particular, a number of empirical studies have documented CNNs sensitivity to low-frequency signals. In this work we show with theory and experiments that this observed sensitivity is a consequence of the frequency distribution of natural images, which is known to have most of its power concentrated in low-to-mid frequencies. Our theoretical analysis relies on representations of the layers of a CNN in frequency space, an idea that has previously been used to accelerate computations and study implicit bias of network training algorithms, but to the best of our knowledge has not been applied in the domain of model robustness.