With the growing privacy concerns in recommender systems, recommendation unlearning, i.e., forgetting the impact of specific learned targets, is getting increasing attention. Existing studies predominantly use training data, i.e., model inputs, as the unlearning target. However, we find that attackers can extract private information, i.e., gender, race, and age, from a trained model even if it has not been explicitly encountered during training. We name this unseen information as attribute and treat it as the unlearning target. To protect the sensitive attribute of users, Attribute Unlearning (AU) aims to degrade attacking performance and make target attributes indistinguishable. In this paper, we focus on a strict but practical setting of AU, namely Post-Training Attribute Unlearning (PoT-AU), where unlearning can only be performed after the training of the recommendation model is completed. To address the PoT-AU problem in recommender systems, we design a two-component loss function that consists of i) distinguishability loss: making attribute labels indistinguishable from attackers, and ii) regularization loss: preventing drastic changes in the model that result in a negative impact on recommendation performance. Specifically, we investigate two types of distinguishability measurements, i.e., user-to-user and distribution-to-distribution. We use the stochastic gradient descent algorithm to optimize our proposed loss. Extensive experiments on three real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed methods.