In-Orbit Processing or Not? Sunlight-Aware Task Scheduling for Energy-Efficient Space Edge Computing Networks

With the rapid evolution of space-borne capabilities, space edge computing (SEC) is becoming a new computation paradigm for future integrated space and terrestrial networks. Satellite edges adopt advanced on-board hardware, which not only enables new opportunities to perform complex intelligent tasks in orbit, but also involves new challenges due to the additional energy consumption in power-constrained space environment. In this paper, we present PHOENIX, an energy-efficient task scheduling framework for emerging SEC networks. PHOENIX exploits a key insight that in the SEC network, there always exist a number of sunlit edges which are illuminated during the entire orbital period and have sufficient energy supplement from the sun. PHOENIX accomplishes energy-efficient in-orbit computing by judiciously offloading space tasks to "sunlight-sufficient" edges or to the ground. Specifically, PHOENIX first formulates the SEC battery energy optimizing (SBEO) problem which aims at minimizing the average battery energy consumption while satisfying various task completion constraints. Then PHOENIX incorporates a sunlight-aware scheduling mechanism to solve the SBEO problem and schedule SEC tasks efficiently. Finally, we implement a PHOENIX prototype and build an SEC testbed. Extensive data-driven evaluations demonstrate that as compared to other state-of-the-art solutions, PHOENIX can effectively reduce up to 54.8% SEC battery energy consumption and prolong battery lifetime to 2.9$\times$ while still completing tasks on time.

One-bit Flip is All You Need: When Bit-flip Attack Meets Model Training

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely deployed on real-world devices. Concerns regarding their security have gained great attention from researchers. Recently, a new weight modification attack called bit flip attack (BFA) was proposed, which exploits memory fault inject techniques such as row hammer to attack quantized models in the deployment stage. With only a few bit flips, the target model can be rendered useless as a random guesser or even be implanted with malicious functionalities. In this work, we seek to further reduce the number of bit flips. We propose a training-assisted bit flip attack, in which the adversary is involved in the training stage to build a high-risk model to release. This high-risk model, obtained coupled with a corresponding malicious model, behaves normally and can escape various detection methods. The results on benchmark datasets show that an adversary can easily convert this high-risk but normal model to a malicious one on victim's side by \textbf{flipping only one critical bit} on average in the deployment stage. Moreover, our attack still poses a significant threat even when defenses are employed. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at \url{https://github.com/jianshuod/TBA}.