Abstract:Vision-language models (VLMs) seamlessly integrate visual and textual data to perform tasks such as image classification, caption generation, and visual question answering. However, adversarial images often struggle to deceive all prompts effectively in the context of cross-prompt migration attacks, as the probability distribution of the tokens in these images tends to favor the semantics of the original image rather than the target tokens. To address this challenge, we propose a Contextual-Injection Attack (CIA) that employs gradient-based perturbation to inject target tokens into both visual and textual contexts, thereby improving the probability distribution of the target tokens. By shifting the contextual semantics towards the target tokens instead of the original image semantics, CIA enhances the cross-prompt transferability of adversarial images.Extensive experiments on the BLIP2, InstructBLIP, and LLaVA models show that CIA outperforms existing methods in cross-prompt transferability, demonstrating its potential for more effective adversarial strategies in VLMs.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance in various natural language processing tasks, especially in dialogue systems. However, LLM may also pose security and moral threats, especially in multi round conversations where large models are more easily guided by contextual content, resulting in harmful or biased responses. In this paper, we present a novel method to attack LLMs in multi-turn dialogues, called CoA (Chain of Attack). CoA is a semantic-driven contextual multi-turn attack method that adaptively adjusts the attack policy through contextual feedback and semantic relevance during multi-turn of dialogue with a large model, resulting in the model producing unreasonable or harmful content. We evaluate CoA on different LLMs and datasets, and show that it can effectively expose the vulnerabilities of LLMs, and outperform existing attack methods. Our work provides a new perspective and tool for attacking and defending LLMs, and contributes to the security and ethical assessment of dialogue systems.