Decomposition of surprisal: Unified computational model of ERP components in language processing

The functional interpretation of language-related ERP components has been a central debate in psycholinguistics for decades. We advance an information-theoretic model of human language processing in the brain in which incoming linguistic input is processed at first shallowly and later with more depth, with these two kinds of information processing corresponding to distinct electroencephalographic signatures. Formally, we show that the information content (surprisal) of a word in context can be decomposed into two quantities: (A) heuristic surprise, which signals shallow processing difficulty for a word, and corresponds with the N400 signal; and (B) discrepancy signal, which reflects the discrepancy between shallow and deep interpretations, and corresponds to the P600 signal. Both of these quantities can be estimated straightforwardly using modern NLP models. We validate our theory by successfully simulating ERP patterns elicited by a variety of linguistic manipulations in previously-reported experimental data from six experiments, with successful novel qualitative and quantitative predictions. Our theory is compatible with traditional cognitive theories assuming a `good-enough' heuristic interpretation stage, but with a precise information-theoretic formulation. The model provides an information-theoretic model of ERP components grounded on cognitive processes, and brings us closer to a fully-specified neuro-computational model of language processing.

A hierarchical Bayesian model for syntactic priming

The effect of syntactic priming exhibits three well-documented empirical properties: the lexical boost, the inverse frequency effect, and the asymmetrical decay. We aim to show how these three empirical phenomena can be reconciled in a general learning framework, the hierarchical Bayesian model (HBM). The model represents syntactic knowledge in a hierarchical structure of syntactic statistics, where a lower level represents the verb-specific biases of syntactic decisions, and a higher level represents the abstract bias as an aggregation of verb-specific biases. This knowledge is updated in response to experience by Bayesian inference. In simulations, we show that the HBM captures the above-mentioned properties of syntactic priming. The results indicate that some properties of priming which are usually explained by a residual activation account can also be explained by an implicit learning account. We also discuss the model's implications for the lexical basis of syntactic priming.

Linguistic Structure from a Bottleneck on Sequential Information Processing

Human language is a unique form of communication in the natural world, distinguished by its structured nature. Most fundamentally, it is systematic, meaning that signals can be broken down into component parts that are individually meaningful -- roughly, words -- which are combined in a regular way to form sentences. Furthermore, the way in which these parts are combined maintains a kind of locality: words are usually concatenated together, and they form contiguous phrases, keeping related parts of sentences close to each other. We address the challenge of understanding how these basic properties of language arise from broader principles of efficient communication under information processing constraints. Here we show that natural-language-like systematicity arises from minimization of excess entropy, a measure of statistical complexity that represents the minimum amount of information necessary for predicting the future of a sequence based on its past. In simulations, we show that codes that minimize excess entropy factorize their source distributions into approximately independent components, and then express those components systematically and locally. Next, in a series of massively cross-linguistic corpus studies, we show that human languages are structured to have low excess entropy at the level of phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics. Our result suggests that human language performs a sequential generalization of Independent Components Analysis on the statistical distribution over meanings that need to be expressed. It establishes a link between the statistical and algebraic structure of human language, and reinforces the idea that the structure of human language may have evolved to minimize cognitive load while maximizing communicative expressiveness.

An information-theoretic model of shallow and deep language comprehension

A large body of work in psycholinguistics has focused on the idea that online language comprehension can be shallow or `good enough': given constraints on time or available computation, comprehenders may form interpretations of their input that are plausible but inaccurate. However, this idea has not yet been linked with formal theories of computation under resource constraints. Here we use information theory to formulate a model of language comprehension as an optimal trade-off between accuracy and processing depth, formalized as bits of information extracted from the input, which increases with processing time. The model provides a measure of processing effort as the change in processing depth, which we link to EEG signals and reading times. We validate our theory against a large-scale dataset of garden path sentence reading times, and EEG experiments featuring N400, P600 and biphasic ERP effects. By quantifying the timecourse of language processing as it proceeds from shallow to deep, our model provides a unified framework to explain behavioral and neural signatures of language comprehension.

Mission: Impossible Language Models

Chomsky and others have very directly claimed that large language models (LLMs) are equally capable of learning languages that are possible and impossible for humans to learn. However, there is very little published experimental evidence to support such a claim. Here, we develop a set of synthetic impossible languages of differing complexity, each designed by systematically altering English data with unnatural word orders and grammar rules. These languages lie on an impossibility continuum: at one end are languages that are inherently impossible, such as random and irreversible shuffles of English words, and on the other, languages that may not be intuitively impossible but are often considered so in linguistics, particularly those with rules based on counting word positions. We report on a wide range of evaluations to assess the capacity of GPT-2 small models to learn these uncontroversially impossible languages, and crucially, we perform these assessments at various stages throughout training to compare the learning process for each language. Our core finding is that GPT-2 struggles to learn impossible languages when compared to English as a control, challenging the core claim. More importantly, we hope our approach opens up a productive line of inquiry in which different LLM architectures are tested on a variety of impossible languages in an effort to learn more about how LLMs can be used as tools for these cognitive and typological investigations.

Exploring the Sensitivity of LLMs' Decision-Making Capabilities: Insights from Prompt Variation and Hyperparameters

The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has led to their widespread use across a broad spectrum of tasks including decision making. Prior studies have compared the decision making abilities of LLMs with those of humans from a psychological perspective. However, these studies have not always properly accounted for the sensitivity of LLMs' behavior to hyperparameters and variations in the prompt. In this study, we examine LLMs' performance on the Horizon decision making task studied by Binz and Schulz (2023) analyzing how LLMs respond to variations in prompts and hyperparameters. By experimenting on three OpenAI language models possessing different capabilities, we observe that the decision making abilities fluctuate based on the input prompts and temperature settings. Contrary to previous findings language models display a human-like exploration exploitation tradeoff after simple adjustments to the prompt.

A Cross-Linguistic Pressure for Uniform Information Density in Word Order

While natural languages differ widely in both canonical word order and word order flexibility, their word orders still follow shared cross-linguistic statistical patterns, often attributed to functional pressures. In the effort to identify these pressures, prior work has compared real and counterfactual word orders. Yet one functional pressure has been overlooked in such investigations: the uniform information density (UID) hypothesis, which holds that information should be spread evenly throughout an utterance. Here, we ask whether a pressure for UID may have influenced word order patterns cross-linguistically. To this end, we use computational models to test whether real orders lead to greater information uniformity than counterfactual orders. In our empirical study of 10 typologically diverse languages, we find that: (i) among SVO languages, real word orders consistently have greater uniformity than reverse word orders, and (ii) only linguistically implausible counterfactual orders consistently exceed the uniformity of real orders. These findings are compatible with a pressure for information uniformity in the development and usage of natural languages.

A unified information-theoretic model of EEG signatures of human language processing

We advance an information-theoretic model of human language processing in the brain, in which incoming linguistic input is processed at two levels, in terms of a heuristic interpretation and in terms of error correction. We propose that these two kinds of information processing have distinct electroencephalographic signatures, corresponding to the well-documented N400 and P600 components of language-related event-related potentials (ERPs). Formally, we show that the information content (surprisal) of a word in context can be decomposed into two quantities: (A) heuristic surprise, which signals processing difficulty of word given its inferred context, and corresponds with the N400 signal; and (B) discrepancy signal, which reflects divergence between the true context and the inferred context, and corresponds to the P600 signal. Both of these quantities can be estimated using modern NLP techniques. We validate our theory by successfully simulating ERP patterns elicited by a variety of linguistic manipulations in previously-reported experimental data from Ryskin et al. (2021). Our theory is in principle compatible with traditional cognitive theories assuming a `good-enough' heuristic interpretation stage, but with precise information-theoretic formulation.

When classifying grammatical role, BERT doesn't care about word order... except when it matters

Because meaning can often be inferred from lexical semantics alone, word order is often a redundant cue in natural language. For example, the words chopped, chef, and onion are more likely used to convey "The chef chopped the onion," not "The onion chopped the chef." Recent work has shown large language models to be surprisingly word order invariant, but crucially has largely considered natural prototypical inputs, where compositional meaning mostly matches lexical expectations. To overcome this confound, we probe grammatical role representation in English BERT and GPT-2, on instances where lexical expectations are not sufficient, and word order knowledge is necessary for correct classification. Such non-prototypical instances are naturally occurring English sentences with inanimate subjects or animate objects, or sentences where we systematically swap the arguments to make sentences like "The onion chopped the chef". We find that, while early layer embeddings are largely lexical, word order is in fact crucial in defining the later-layer representations of words in semantically non-prototypical positions. Our experiments isolate the effect of word order on the contextualization process, and highlight how models use context in the uncommon, but critical, instances where it matters.

Grammatical cues are largely, but not completely, redundant with word meanings in natural language

The combinatorial power of language has historically been argued to be enabled by syntax: rules that allow words to combine hierarchically to convey complex meanings. But how important are these rules in practice? We performed a broad-coverage cross-linguistic investigation of the importance of grammatical cues for interpretation. First, English and Russian speakers (n=484) were presented with subjects, verbs, and objects (in random order and with morphological markings removed) extracted from naturally occurring sentences, and were asked to identify which noun is the agent of the action. Accuracy was high in both languages (~89% in English, ~87% in Russian), suggesting that word meanings strongly constrain who is doing what to whom. Next, we trained a neural network machine classifier on a similar task: predicting which nominal in a subject-verb-object triad is the subject. Across 30 languages from eight language families, performance was consistently high: a median accuracy of 87%, comparable to the accuracy observed in the human experiments. These results have ramifications for any theory of why languages look the way that they do, and seemingly pose a challenge for efficiency-based theories: why have grammatical cues for argument role if they only have utility in 10-15% of sentences? We suggest that although grammatical cues are not usually necessary, they are useful in the rare cases when the intended meaning cannot be inferred from the words alone, including descriptions of human interactions, where roles are often reversible (e.g., Ray helped Lu/Lu helped Ray), and expressing non-canonical meanings (e.g., the man bit the dog). Importantly, for such cues to be useful, they have to be reliable, which means being ubiquitously used, including when they are not needed.