Abstract:This is the Proceedings of the Seventh Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, which was held in Los Angeles, CA, July 13-15, 1991
Abstract:This is the Proceedings of the Eighth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, which was held in Stanford, CA, July 17-19, 1992
Abstract:We derive axiomatically the probability function that should be used to make decisions given any form of underlying uncertainty.
Abstract:Inappropriate use of Dempster's rule of combination has led some authors to reject the Dempster-Shafer model, arguing that it leads to supposedly unacceptable conclusions when defaults are involved. A most classic example is about the penguin Tweety. This paper will successively present: the origin of the miss-management of the Tweety example; two types of default; the correct solution for both types based on the transferable belief model (our interpretation of the Dempster-Shafer model (Shafer 1976, Smets 1988)); Except when explicitly stated, all belief functions used in this paper are simple support functions, i.e. belief functions for which only one proposition (the focus) of the frame of discernment receives a positive basic belief mass with the remaining mass being given to the tautology. Each belief function will be described by its focus and the weight of the focus (e.g. m(A)=.9). Computation of the basic belief masses are always performed by vacuously extending each belief function to the product space built from all variables involved, combining them on that space by Dempster's rule of combination, and projecting the result to the space corresponding to each individual variable.
Abstract:In this paper we associate with every (directed) graph G a transformation called the Mobius transformation of the graph G. The Mobius transformation of the graph (O) is of major significance for Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. However, because it is computationally very heavy, the Mobius transformation together with Dempster's rule of combination is a major obstacle to the use of Dempster-Shafer theory for handling uncertainty in expert systems. The major contribution of this paper is the discovery of the 'fast Mobius transformations' of (O). These 'fast Mobius transformations' are the fastest algorithms for computing the Mobius transformation of (O). As an easy but useful application, we provide, via the commonality function, an algorithm for computing Dempster's rule of combination which is much faster than the usual one.
Abstract:Dempster-Shafer's model aims at quantifying degrees of belief But there are so many interpretations of Dempster-Shafer's theory in the literature that it seems useful to present the various contenders in order to clarify their respective positions. We shall successively consider the classical probability model, the upper and lower probabilities model, Dempster's model, the transferable belief model, the evidentiary value model, the provability or necessity model. None of these models has received the qualification of Dempster-Shafer. In fact the transferable belief model is our interpretation not of Dempster's work but of Shafer's work as presented in his book (Shafer 1976, Smets 1988). It is a ?purified' form of Dempster-Shafer's model in which any connection with probability concept has been deleted. Any model for belief has at least two components: one static that describes our state of belief, the other dynamic that explains how to update our belief given new pieces of information. We insist on the fact that both components must be considered in order to study these models. Too many authors restrict themselves to the static component and conclude that Dempster-Shafer theory is the same as some other theory. But once the dynamic component is considered, these conclusions break down. Any comparison based only on the static component is too restricted. The dynamic component must also be considered as the originality of the models based on belief functions lies in its dynamic component.
Abstract:Survey of several forms of updating, with a practical illustrative example. We study several updating (conditioning) schemes that emerge naturally from a common scenarion to provide some insights into their meaning. Updating is a subtle operation and there is no single method, no single 'good' rule. The choice of the appropriate rule must always be given due consideration. Planchet (1989) presents a mathematical survey of many rules. We focus on the practical meaning of these rules. After summarizing the several rules for conditioning, we present an illustrative example in which the various forms of conditioning can be explained.
Abstract:Within the transferable belief model, positive basic belief masses can be allocated to the empty set, leading to unnormalized belief functions. The nature of these unnormalized beliefs is analyzed.
Abstract:The fundamental updating process in the transferable belief model is related to the concept of specialization and can be described by a specialization matrix. The degree of belief in the truth of a proposition is a degree of justified support. The Principle of Minimal Commitment implies that one should never give more support to the truth of a proposition than justified. We show that Dempster's rule of conditioning corresponds essentially to the least committed specialization, and that Dempster's rule of combination results essentially from commutativity requirements. The concept of generalization, dual to thc concept of specialization, is described.
Abstract:In this paper, we present a decision support system based on belief functions and the pignistic transformation. The system is an integration of an evidential system for belief function propagation and a valuation-based system for Bayesian decision analysis. The two subsystems are connected through the pignistic transformation. The system takes as inputs the user's "gut feelings" about a situation and suggests what, if any, are to be tested and in what order, and it does so with a user friendly interface.