Probabilistic Strategy Logic with Degrees of Observability

There has been considerable work on reasoning about the strategic ability of agents under imperfect information. However, existing logics such as Probabilistic Strategy Logic are unable to express properties relating to information transparency. Information transparency concerns the extent to which agents' actions and behaviours are observable by other agents. Reasoning about information transparency is useful in many domains including security, privacy, and decision-making. In this paper, we present a formal framework for reasoning about information transparency properties in stochastic multi-agent systems. We extend Probabilistic Strategy Logic with new observability operators that capture the degree of observability of temporal properties by agents. We show that the model checking problem for the resulting logic is decidable.

Maximally Permissive Reward Machines

Reward machines allow the definition of rewards for temporally extended tasks and behaviors. Specifying "informative" reward machines can be challenging. One way to address this is to generate reward machines from a high-level abstract description of the learning environment, using techniques such as AI planning. However, previous planning-based approaches generate a reward machine based on a single (sequential or partial-order) plan, and do not allow maximum flexibility to the learning agent. In this paper we propose a new approach to synthesising reward machines which is based on the set of partial order plans for a goal. We prove that learning using such "maximally permissive" reward machines results in higher rewards than learning using RMs based on a single plan. We present experimental results which support our theoretical claims by showing that our approach obtains higher rewards than the single-plan approach in practice.

The Complexity of Data-Driven Norm Synthesis and Revision

Norms have been widely proposed as a way of coordinating and controlling the activities of agents in a multi-agent system (MAS). A norm specifies the behaviour an agent should follow in order to achieve the objective of the MAS. However, designing norms to achieve a particular system objective can be difficult, particularly when there is no direct link between the language in which the system objective is stated and the language in which the norms can be expressed. In this paper, we consider the problem of synthesising a norm from traces of agent behaviour, where each trace is labelled with whether the behaviour satisfies the system objective. We show that the norm synthesis problem is NP-complete.

Causality, Responsibility and Blame in Team Plans

Many objectives can be achieved (or may be achieved more effectively) only by a group of agents executing a team plan. If a team plan fails, it is often of interest to determine what caused the failure, the degree of responsibility of each agent for the failure, and the degree of blame attached to each agent. We show how team plans can be represented in terms of structural equations, and then apply the definitions of causality introduced by Halpern [2015] and degree of responsibility and blame introduced by Chockler and Halpern [2004] to determine the agent(s) who caused the failure and what their degree of responsibility/blame is. We also prove new results on the complexity of computing causality and degree of responsibility and blame, showing that they can be determined in polynomial time for many team plans of interest.

Expressibility of norms in temporal logic

In this short note we address the issue of expressing norms (such as obligations and prohibitions) in temporal logic. In particular, we address the argument from [Governatori 2015] that norms cannot be expressed in Linear Time Temporal Logic (LTL).