Abstract:Monocular Depth Estimation (MDE) is a fundamental problem in computer vision with numerous applications. Recently, LIDAR-supervised methods have achieved remarkable per-pixel depth accuracy in outdoor scenes. However, significant errors are typically found in the proximity of depth discontinuities, i.e., depth edges, which often hinder the performance of depth-dependent applications that are sensitive to such inaccuracies, e.g., novel view synthesis and augmented reality. Since direct supervision for the location of depth edges is typically unavailable in sparse LIDAR-based scenes, encouraging the MDE model to produce correct depth edges is not straightforward. In this work we propose to learn to detect the location of depth edges from densely-supervised synthetic data, and use it to generate supervision for the depth edges in the MDE training. %Despite the 'domain gap' between synthetic and real data, we show that depth edges that are estimated directly are significantly more accurate than the ones that emerge indirectly from the MDE training. To quantitatively evaluate our approach, and due to the lack of depth edges ground truth in LIDAR-based scenes, we manually annotated subsets of the KITTI and the DDAD datasets with depth edges ground truth. We demonstrate significant gains in the accuracy of the depth edges with comparable per-pixel depth accuracy on several challenging datasets.
Abstract:We present a novel approach for semantically targeted adversarial attacks on Optical Flow. In such attacks the goal is to corrupt the flow predictions of a specific object category or instance. Usually, an attacker seeks to hide the adversarial perturbations in the input. However, a quick scan of the output reveals the attack. In contrast, our method helps to hide the attackers intent in the output as well. We achieve this thanks to a regularization term that encourages off-target consistency. We perform extensive tests on leading optical flow models to demonstrate the benefits of our approach in both white-box and black-box settings. Also, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack on subsequent tasks that depend on the optical flow.