Abstract:Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) have emerged as promising methodologies for addressing challenges in automated cyber defence (ACD). These techniques offer adaptive decision-making capabilities in high-dimensional, adversarial environments. This report provides a structured set of guidelines for cybersecurity professionals and researchers to assess the suitability of RL and MARL for specific use cases, considering factors such as explainability, exploration needs, and the complexity of multi-agent coordination. It also discusses key algorithmic approaches, implementation challenges, and real-world constraints, such as data scarcity and adversarial interference. The report further outlines open research questions, including policy optimality, agent cooperation levels, and the integration of MARL systems into operational cybersecurity frameworks. By bridging theoretical advancements and practical deployment, these guidelines aim to enhance the effectiveness of AI-driven cyber defence strategies.
Abstract:In previous work, the IPMSRL environment (Integrated Platform Management System Reinforcement Learning environment) was developed with the aim of training defensive RL agents in a simulator representing a subset of an IPMS on a maritime vessel under a cyber-attack. This paper extends the use of IPMSRL to enhance realism including the additional dynamics of false positive alerts and alert delay. Applying curriculum learning, in the most difficult environment tested, resulted in an episode reward mean increasing from a baseline result of -2.791 to -0.569. Applying action masking, in the most difficult environment tested, resulted in an episode reward mean increasing from a baseline result of -2.791 to -0.743. Importantly, this level of performance was reached in less than 1 million timesteps, which was far more data efficient than vanilla PPO which reached a lower level of performance after 2.5 million timesteps. The training method which resulted in the highest level of performance observed in this paper was a combination of the application of curriculum learning and action masking, with a mean episode reward of 0.137. This paper also introduces a basic hardcoded defensive agent encoding a representation of cyber security best practice, which provides context to the episode reward mean figures reached by the RL agents. The hardcoded agent managed an episode reward mean of -1.895. This paper therefore shows that applications of curriculum learning and action masking, both independently and in tandem, present a way to overcome the complex real-world dynamics that are present in operational technology cyber security threat remediation.