Abstract:As space becomes increasingly crowded and contested, robust autonomous capabilities for multi-agent environments are gaining critical importance. Current autonomous systems in space primarily rely on optimization-based path planning or long-range orbital maneuvers, which have not yet proven effective in adversarial scenarios where one satellite is actively pursuing another. We introduce Divergent Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (DARL), a two-stage Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) approach designed to train autonomous evasion strategies for satellites engaged with multiple adversarial spacecraft. Our method enhances exploration during training by promoting diverse adversarial strategies, leading to more robust and adaptable evader models. We validate DARL through a cat-and-mouse satellite scenario, modeled as a partially observable multi-agent capture the flag game where two adversarial `cat' spacecraft pursue a single `mouse' evader. DARL's performance is compared against several benchmarks, including an optimization-based satellite path planner, demonstrating its ability to produce highly robust models for adversarial multi-agent space environments.
Abstract:Spacecraft are among the earliest autonomous systems. Their ability to function without a human in the loop have afforded some of humanity's grandest achievements. As reliance on autonomy grows, space vehicles will become increasingly vulnerable to attacks designed to disrupt autonomous processes-especially probabilistic ones based on machine learning. This paper aims to elucidate and demonstrate the threats that adversarial machine learning (AML) capabilities pose to spacecraft. First, an AML threat taxonomy for spacecraft is introduced. Next, we demonstrate the execution of AML attacks against spacecraft through experimental simulations using NASA's Core Flight System (cFS) and NASA's On-board Artificial Intelligence Research (OnAIR) Platform. Our findings highlight the imperative for incorporating AML-focused security measures in spacecraft that engage autonomy.
Abstract:Cyber-Physical systems (CPS) have complex lifecycles involving multiple stakeholders, and the transparency of both hardware and software components' supply chain is opaque at best. This raises concerns for stakeholders who may not trust that what they receive is what was requested. There is an opportunity to build a cyberphysical titling process offering universal traceability and the ability to differentiate systems based on provenance. Today, RFID tags and barcodes address some of these needs, though they are easily manipulated due to non-linkage with an object or system's intrinsic characteristics. We propose cyberphysical sequencing as a low-cost, light-weight and pervasive means of adding track-and-trace capabilities to any asset that ties a system's physical identity to a unique and invariant digital identifier. CPS sequencing offers benefits similar Digital Twins' for identifying and managing the provenance and identity of an asset throughout its life with far fewer computational and other resources.