On the referential capacity of language models: An internalist rejoinder to Mandelkern & Linzen

In a recent paper, Mandelkern & Linzen (2024) - henceforth M&L - address the question of whether language models' (LMs) words refer. Their argument draws from the externalist tradition in philosophical semantics, which views reference as the capacity of words to "achieve 'word-to-world' connections". In the externalist framework, causally uninterrupted chains of usage, tracing every occurrence of a name back to its bearer, guarantee that, for example, 'Peano' refers to the individual Peano (Kripke 1980). This account is externalist both because words pick out referents 'out there' in the world, and because what determines reference are coordinated linguistic actions by members of a community, and not individual mental states. The "central question to ask", for M&L, is whether LMs too belong to human linguistic communities, such that words by LMs may also trace back causally to their bearers. Their answer is a cautious "yes": inputs to LMs are linguistic "forms with particular histories of referential use"; "those histories ground the referents of those forms"; any occurrence of 'Peano' in LM outputs is as causally connected to the individual Peano as any other occurrence of the same proper name in human speech or text; therefore, occurrences of 'Peano' in LM outputs refer to Peano. In this commentary, we first qualify M&L's claim as applying to a narrow class of natural language expressions. Thus qualified, their claim is valid, and we emphasise an additional motivation for that in Section 2. Next, we discuss the actual scope of their claim, and we suggest that the way they formulate it may lead to unwarranted generalisations about reference in LMs. Our critique is likewise applicable to other externalist accounts of LMs (e.g., Lederman & Mahowald 2024; Mollo & Milliere 2023). Lastly, we conclude with a comment on the status of LMs as members of human linguistic communities.

A Comparative Investigation of Compositional Syntax and Semantics in DALL-E 2

In this study we compared how well DALL-E 2 visually represented the meaning of linguistic prompts also given to young children in comprehension tests. Sentences representing fundamental components of grammatical knowledge were selected from assessment tests used with several hundred English-speaking children aged 2-7 years for whom we had collected original item-level data. DALL-E 2 was given these prompts five times to generate 20 cartoons per item, for 9 adult judges to score. Results revealed no conditions in which DALL-E 2-generated images that matched the semantic accuracy of children, even at the youngest age (2 years). DALL-E 2 failed to assign the appropriate roles in reversible forms; it failed on negation despite an easier contrastive prompt than the children received; it often assigned the adjective to the wrong noun; it ignored implicit agents in passives. This work points to a clear absence of compositional sentence representations for DALL-E 2.

What is a word?

In order to design strong paradigms for isolating lexical access and semantics, we need to know what a word is. Surprisingly few linguists and philosophers have a clear model of what a word is, even though words impact basically every aspect of human life. Researchers that regularly publish academic papers about language often rely on outdated, or inaccurate, assumptions about wordhood. This short pedagogical document outlines what the lexicon is most certainly not (though is often mistakenly taken to be), what it might be (based on current good theories), and what some implications for experimental design are.

The Quo Vadis of the Relationship between Language and Large Language Models

In the field of Artificial (General) Intelligence (AI), the several recent advancements in Natural language processing (NLP) activities relying on Large Language Models (LLMs) have come to encourage the adoption of LLMs as scientific models of language. While the terminology employed for the characterization of LLMs favors their embracing as such, it is not clear that they are in a place to offer insights into the target system they seek to represent. After identifying the most important theoretical and empirical risks brought about by the adoption of scientific models that lack transparency, we discuss LLMs relating them to every scientific model's fundamental components: the object, the medium, the meaning and the user. We conclude that, at their current stage of development, LLMs hardly offer any explanations for language, and then we provide an outlook for more informative future research directions on this topic.

A Sentence is Worth a Thousand Pictures: Can Large Language Models Understand Human Language?

Artificial Intelligence applications show great potential for language-related tasks that rely on next-word prediction. The current generation of large language models have been linked to claims about human-like linguistic performance and their applications are hailed both as a key step towards Artificial General Intelligence and as major advance in understanding the cognitive, and even neural basis of human language. We analyze the contribution of large language models as theoretically informative representations of a target system vs. atheoretical powerful mechanistic tools, and we identify the key abilities that are still missing from the current state of development and exploitation of these models.

ROSE: A Neurocomputational Architecture for Syntax

A comprehensive model of natural language processing in the brain must accommodate four components: representations, operations, structures and encoding. It further requires a principled account of how these components mechanistically, and causally, relate to each another. While previous models have isolated regions of interest for structure-building and lexical access, many gaps remain with respect to bridging distinct scales of neural complexity. By expanding existing accounts of how neural oscillations can index various linguistic processes, this article proposes a neurocomputational architecture for syntax, termed the ROSE model (Representation, Operation, Structure, Encoding). Under ROSE, the basic data structures of syntax are atomic features, types of mental representations (R), and are coded at the single-unit and ensemble level. Elementary computations (O) that transform these units into manipulable objects accessible to subsequent structure-building levels are coded via high frequency gamma activity. Low frequency synchronization and cross-frequency coupling code for recursive categorial inferences (S). Distinct forms of low frequency coupling and phase-amplitude coupling (delta-theta coupling via pSTS-IFG; theta-gamma coupling via IFG to conceptual hubs) then encode these structures onto distinct workspaces (E). Causally connecting R to O is spike-phase/LFP coupling; connecting O to S is phase-amplitude coupling; connecting S to E is a system of frontotemporal traveling oscillations; connecting E to lower levels is low-frequency phase resetting of spike-LFP coupling. ROSE is reliant on neurophysiologically plausible mechanisms, is supported at all four levels by a range of recent empirical research, and provides an anatomically precise and falsifiable grounding for the basic property of natural language syntax: hierarchical, recursive structure-building.

Testing AI performance on less frequent aspects of language reveals insensitivity to underlying meaning

Advances in computational methods and big data availability have recently translated into breakthroughs in AI applications. With successes in bottom-up challenges partially overshadowing shortcomings, the 'human-like' performance of Large Language Models has raised the question of how linguistic performance is achieved by algorithms. Given systematic shortcomings in generalization across many AI systems, in this work we ask whether linguistic performance is indeed guided by language knowledge in Large Language Models. To this end, we prompt GPT-3 with a grammaticality judgement task and comprehension questions on less frequent constructions that are thus unlikely to form part of Large Language Models' training data. These included grammatical 'illusions', semantic anomalies, complex nested hierarchies and self-embeddings. GPT-3 failed for every prompt but one, often offering answers that show a critical lack of understanding even of high-frequency words used in these less frequent grammatical constructions. The present work sheds light on the boundaries of the alleged AI human-like linguistic competence and argues that, far from human-like, the next-word prediction abilities of LLMs may face issues of robustness, when pushed beyond training data.

Natural Language Syntax Complies with the Free-Energy Principle

Natural language syntax yields an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions. We claim that these are used in the service of active inference in accord with the free-energy principle (FEP). While conceptual advances alongside modelling and simulation work have attempted to connect speech segmentation and linguistic communication with the FEP, we extend this program to the underlying computations responsible for generating syntactic objects. We argue that recently proposed principles of economy in language design - such as "minimal search" criteria from theoretical syntax - adhere to the FEP. This affords a greater degree of explanatory power to the FEP - with respect to higher language functions - and offers linguistics a grounding in first principles with respect to computability. We show how both tree-geometric depth and a Kolmogorov complexity estimate (recruiting a Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm) can be used to accurately predict legal operations on syntactic workspaces, directly in line with formulations of variational free energy minimization. This is used to motivate a general principle of language design that we term Turing-Chomsky Compression (TCC). We use TCC to align concerns of linguists with the normative account of self-organization furnished by the FEP, by marshalling evidence from theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics to ground core principles of efficient syntactic computation within active inference.

DALL-E 2 Fails to Reliably Capture Common Syntactic Processes

Machine intelligence is increasingly being linked to claims about sentience, language processing, and an ability to comprehend and transform natural language into a range of stimuli. We systematically analyze the ability of DALL-E 2 to capture 8 grammatical phenomena pertaining to compositionality that are widely discussed in linguistics and pervasive in human language: binding principles and coreference, passives, word order, coordination, comparatives, negation, ellipsis, and structural ambiguity. Whereas young children routinely master these phenomena, learning systematic mappings between syntax and semantics, DALL-E 2 is unable to reliably infer meanings that are consistent with the syntax. These results challenge recent claims concerning the capacity of such systems to understand of human language. We make available the full set of test materials as a benchmark for future testing.