Towards a Universal Synthetic Video Detector: From Face or Background Manipulations to Fully AI-Generated Content

Existing DeepFake detection techniques primarily focus on facial manipulations, such as face-swapping or lip-syncing. However, advancements in text-to-video (T2V) and image-to-video (I2V) generative models now allow fully AI-generated synthetic content and seamless background alterations, challenging face-centric detection methods and demanding more versatile approaches. To address this, we introduce the \underline{U}niversal \underline{N}etwork for \underline{I}dentifying \underline{T}ampered and synth\underline{E}tic videos (\texttt{UNITE}) model, which, unlike traditional detectors, captures full-frame manipulations. \texttt{UNITE} extends detection capabilities to scenarios without faces, non-human subjects, and complex background modifications. It leverages a transformer-based architecture that processes domain-agnostic features extracted from videos via the SigLIP-So400M foundation model. Given limited datasets encompassing both facial/background alterations and T2V/I2V content, we integrate task-irrelevant data alongside standard DeepFake datasets in training. We further mitigate the model's tendency to over-focus on faces by incorporating an attention-diversity (AD) loss, which promotes diverse spatial attention across video frames. Combining AD loss with cross-entropy improves detection performance across varied contexts. Comparative evaluations demonstrate that \texttt{UNITE} outperforms state-of-the-art detectors on datasets (in cross-data settings) featuring face/background manipulations and fully synthetic T2V/I2V videos, showcasing its adaptability and generalizable detection capabilities.

Can DeepFake Speech be Reliably Detected?

Recent advances in text-to-speech (TTS) systems, particularly those with voice cloning capabilities, have made voice impersonation readily accessible, raising ethical and legal concerns due to potential misuse for malicious activities like misinformation campaigns and fraud. While synthetic speech detectors (SSDs) exist to combat this, they are vulnerable to ``test domain shift", exhibiting decreased performance when audio is altered through transcoding, playback, or background noise. This vulnerability is further exacerbated by deliberate manipulation of synthetic speech aimed at deceiving detectors. This work presents the first systematic study of such active malicious attacks against state-of-the-art open-source SSDs. White-box attacks, black-box attacks, and their transferability are studied from both attack effectiveness and stealthiness, using both hardcoded metrics and human ratings. The results highlight the urgent need for more robust detection methods in the face of evolving adversarial threats.