GRASP: A Grid-Based Benchmark for Evaluating Commonsense Spatial Reasoning

Spatial reasoning, an important faculty of human cognition with many practical applications, is one of the core commonsense skills that is not purely language-based and, for satisfying (as opposed to optimal) solutions, requires some minimum degree of planning. Existing benchmarks of Commonsense Spatial Reasoning (CSR) tend to evaluate how Large Language Models (LLMs) interpret text-based spatial descriptions rather than directly evaluate a plan produced by the LLM in response to a spatial reasoning scenario. In this paper, we construct a large-scale benchmark called $\textbf{GRASP}$, which consists of 16,000 grid-based environments where the agent is tasked with an energy collection problem. These environments include 100 grid instances instantiated using each of the 160 different grid settings, involving five different energy distributions, two modes of agent starting position, and two distinct obstacle configurations, as well as three kinds of agent constraints. Using GRASP, we compare classic baseline approaches, such as random walk and greedy search methods, with advanced LLMs like GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4o. The experimental results indicate that even these advanced LLMs struggle to consistently achieve satisfactory solutions.

Is persona enough for personality? Using ChatGPT to reconstruct an agent's latent personality from simple descriptions

Personality, a fundamental aspect of human cognition, contains a range of traits that influence behaviors, thoughts, and emotions. This paper explores the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in reconstructing these complex cognitive attributes based only on simple descriptions containing socio-demographic and personality type information. Utilizing the HEXACO personality framework, our study examines the consistency of LLMs in recovering and predicting underlying (latent) personality dimensions from simple descriptions. Our experiments reveal a significant degree of consistency in personality reconstruction, although some inconsistencies and biases, such as a tendency to default to positive traits in the absence of explicit information, are also observed. Additionally, socio-demographic factors like age and number of children were found to influence the reconstructed personality dimensions. These findings have implications for building sophisticated agent-based simulacra using LLMs and highlight the need for further research on robust personality generation in LLMs.

An Evaluation of Estimative Uncertainty in Large Language Models

Words of estimative probability (WEPs), such as ''maybe'' or ''probably not'' are ubiquitous in natural language for communicating estimative uncertainty, compared with direct statements involving numerical probability. Human estimative uncertainty, and its calibration with numerical estimates, has long been an area of study -- including by intelligence agencies like the CIA. This study compares estimative uncertainty in commonly used large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 and ERNIE-4 to that of humans, and to each other. Here we show that LLMs like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 align with human estimates for some, but not all, WEPs presented in English. Divergence is also observed when the LLM is presented with gendered roles and Chinese contexts. Further study shows that an advanced LLM like GPT-4 can consistently map between statistical and estimative uncertainty, but a significant performance gap remains. The results contribute to a growing body of research on human-LLM alignment.

A Pilot Evaluation of ChatGPT and DALL-E 2 on Decision Making and Spatial Reasoning

We conduct a pilot study selectively evaluating the cognitive abilities (decision making and spatial reasoning) of two recently released generative transformer models, ChatGPT and DALL-E 2. Input prompts were constructed following neutral a priori guidelines, rather than adversarial intent. Post hoc qualitative analysis of the outputs shows that DALL-E 2 is able to generate at least one correct image for each spatial reasoning prompt, but most images generated are incorrect (even though the model seems to have a clear understanding of the objects mentioned in the prompt). Similarly, in evaluating ChatGPT on the rationality axioms developed under the classical Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem, we find that, although it demonstrates some level of rational decision-making, many of its decisions violate at least one of the axioms even under reasonable constructions of preferences, bets, and decision-making prompts. ChatGPT's outputs on such problems generally tended to be unpredictable: even as it made irrational decisions (or employed an incorrect reasoning process) for some simpler decision-making problems, it was able to draw correct conclusions for more complex bet structures. We briefly comment on the nuances and challenges involved in scaling up such a 'cognitive' evaluation or conducting it with a closed set of answer keys ('ground truth'), given that these models are inherently generative and open-ended in responding to prompts.

Can Language Representation Models Think in Bets?

In recent years, transformer-based language representation models (LRMs) have achieved state-of-the-art results on difficult natural language understanding problems, such as question answering and text summarization. As these models are integrated into real-world applications, evaluating their ability to make rational decisions is an important research agenda, with practical ramifications. This article investigates LRMs' rational decision-making ability through a carefully designed set of decision-making benchmarks and experiments. Inspired by classic work in cognitive science, we model the decision-making problem as a bet. We then investigate an LRM's ability to choose outcomes that have optimal, or at minimum, positive expected gain. Through a robust body of experiments on four established LRMs, we show that a model is only able to `think in bets' if it is first fine-tuned on bet questions with an identical structure. Modifying the bet question's structure, while still retaining its fundamental characteristics, decreases an LRM's performance by more than 25\%, on average, although absolute performance remains well above random. LRMs are also found to be more rational when selecting outcomes with non-negative expected gain, rather than optimal or strictly positive expected gain. Our results suggest that LRMs could potentially be applied to tasks that rely on cognitive decision-making skills, but that more research is necessary before they can robustly make rational decisions.