Learning to Bid in FCR Markets: A Best-of-Both-Worlds Approach

Bidding in the European Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) market is challenging for flexibility providers because competing offers are hidden and bidders observe only partial feedback form the market, such as, clearing price and awarded quantity. For a participant active in a single country, we show that the multi-country FCR clearing problem can be recast as a repeated multi-unit uniform-price auction against an endogenous vector of opposing bids. This reformulation yields an online learning problem and allows us to adapt a Best-of-Both-Worlds combinatorial semi-bandit algorithm implementable from this standard market feedback. The resulting bidder achieves logarithmic pseudo-regret in stochastic environments and $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in adversarial ones. Synthetic experiments confirm the expected scaling, and backtests on historical European FCR data show competitive performance in practice: the method performs especially well on stable products, while EXP3-type baselines can be safer under stronger non-stationarity. Overall, the results show that learning-based bidding in FCR markets is theoretically grounded and practically useful when the learning rule matches product-level market stability.

Instance-dependent Stochastic Lipschitz bandit

We study the Lipschitz bandit problem, where a learner sequentially maximizes an unknown Lipschitz function $f$ over a domain $\mathcal{X} \subset [0,1]^d$ using noisy pointwise evaluations. Existing regret bounds are either worst-case, scaling as $\tildeΘ \left ( T^{d+1/d+2}\right )$, or adaptive via the zooming dimension $d_z$, yielding $\tildeΘ \left ( T^{d_z+1/d_z+2}\right )$. However, such zooming-based guarantees are only partially instance-dependent, as they depend solely on the asymptotic growth of near-optimal level sets and fail to capture finer structural properties of $f$. We provide an analysis and an algorithm that characterizes the regret through integrals of the suboptimality gap of $f$ over its level sets. This yields regret bounds that adapt to the local growth of level sets, rather than only their asymptotic behavior. As a corollary, when the set of maximizers has dimension $d^\star>0$, we obtain improved adaptive rates of order $\tilde{\mathcal{O}} \left ( T^{d_z+1 / \max(d_z,d^\star)+2}\right )$ strictly improving over classical zooming bounds in this regime. Finally, we extend our analysis to the full-information setting (Lipschitz experts) and show how some of the regularity assumptions can be relaxed.

Improved learning rates in multi-unit uniform price auctions

Motivated by the strategic participation of electricity producers in electricity day-ahead market, we study the problem of online learning in repeated multi-unit uniform price auctions focusing on the adversarial opposing bid setting. The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new modeling of the bid space. Indeed, we prove that a learning algorithm leveraging the structure of this problem achieves a regret of $\tilde{O}(K^{4/3}T^{2/3})$ under bandit feedback, improving over the bound of $\tilde{O}(K^{7/4}T^{3/4})$ previously obtained in the literature. This improved regret rate is tight up to logarithmic terms. Inspired by electricity reserve markets, we further introduce a different feedback model under which all winning bids are revealed. This feedback interpolates between the full-information and bandit scenarios depending on the auctions' results. We prove that, under this feedback, the algorithm that we propose achieves regret $\tilde{O}(K^{5/2}\sqrt{T})$.