An Online Feasible Point Method for Benign Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

We consider a repeatedly played generalized Nash equilibrium game. This induces a multi-agent online learning problem with joint constraints. An important challenge in this setting is that the feasible set for each agent depends on the simultaneous moves of the other agents and, therefore, varies over time. As a consequence, the agents face time-varying constraints, which are not adversarial but rather endogenous to the system. Prior work in this setting focused on convergence to a feasible solution in the limit via integrating the constraints in the objective as a penalty function. However, no existing work can guarantee that the constraints are satisfied for all iterations while simultaneously guaranteeing convergence to a generalized Nash equilibrium. This is a problem of fundamental theoretical interest and practical relevance. In this work, we introduce a new online feasible point method. Under the assumption that limited communication between the agents is allowed, this method guarantees feasibility. We identify the class of benign generalized Nash equilibrium problems, for which the convergence of our method to the equilibrium is guaranteed. We set this class of benign generalized Nash equilibrium games in context with existing definitions and illustrate our method with examples.

Accelerated Rates between Stochastic and Adversarial Online Convex Optimization

Stochastic and adversarial data are two widely studied settings in online learning. But many optimization tasks are neither i.i.d. nor fully adversarial, which makes it of fundamental interest to get a better theoretical understanding of the world between these extremes. In this work we establish novel regret bounds for online convex optimization in a setting that interpolates between stochastic i.i.d. and fully adversarial losses. By exploiting smoothness of the expected losses, these bounds replace a dependence on the maximum gradient length by the variance of the gradients, which was previously known only for linear losses. In addition, they weaken the i.i.d. assumption by allowing, for example, adversarially poisoned rounds, which were previously considered in the related expert and bandit settings. In the fully i.i.d. case, our regret bounds match the rates one would expect from results in stochastic acceleration, and we also recover the optimal stochastically accelerated rates via online-to-batch conversion. In the fully adversarial case our bounds gracefully deteriorate to match the minimax regret. We further provide lower bounds showing that our regret upper bounds are tight for all intermediate regimes in terms of the stochastic variance and the adversarial variation of the loss gradients.