Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being harnessed to automate cyberattacks, making sophisticated exploits more accessible and scalable. In response, we propose a new defense strategy tailored to counter LLM-driven cyberattacks. We introduce Mantis, a defensive framework that exploits LLMs' susceptibility to adversarial inputs to undermine malicious operations. Upon detecting an automated cyberattack, Mantis plants carefully crafted inputs into system responses, leading the attacker's LLM to disrupt their own operations (passive defense) or even compromise the attacker's machine (active defense). By deploying purposefully vulnerable decoy services to attract the attacker and using dynamic prompt injections for the attacker's LLM, Mantis can autonomously hack back the attacker. In our experiments, Mantis consistently achieved over 95% effectiveness against automated LLM-driven attacks. To foster further research and collaboration, Mantis is available as an open-source tool: https://github.com/pasquini-dario/project_mantis
Abstract:We introduce LLMmap, a first-generation fingerprinting attack targeted at LLM-integrated applications. LLMmap employs an active fingerprinting approach, sending carefully crafted queries to the application and analyzing the responses to identify the specific LLM model in use. With as few as 8 interactions, LLMmap can accurately identify LLMs with over 95% accuracy. More importantly, LLMmap is designed to be robust across different application layers, allowing it to identify LLMs operating under various system prompts, stochastic sampling hyperparameters, and even complex generation frameworks such as RAG or Chain-of-Thought.
Abstract:Adversarial examples are a widely studied phenomenon in machine learning models. While most of the attention has been focused on neural networks, other practical models also suffer from this issue. In this work, we propose an algorithm for evaluating the adversarial robustness of $k$-nearest neighbor classification, i.e., finding a minimum-norm adversarial example. Diverging from previous proposals, we take a geometric approach by performing a search that expands outwards from a given input point. On a high level, the search radius expands to the nearby Voronoi cells until we find a cell that classifies differently from the input point. To scale the algorithm to a large $k$, we introduce approximation steps that find perturbations with smaller norm, compared to the baselines, in a variety of datasets. Furthermore, we analyze the structural properties of a dataset where our approach outperforms the competition.
Abstract:The concept of learned index structures relies on the idea that the input-output functionality of a database index can be viewed as a prediction task and, thus, be implemented using a machine learning model instead of traditional algorithmic techniques. This novel angle for a decades-old problem has inspired numerous exciting results in the intersection of machine learning and data structures. However, the main advantage of learned index structures, i.e., the ability to adjust to the data at hand via the underlying ML-model, can become a disadvantage from a security perspective as it could be exploited. In this work, we present the first study of poisoning attacks on learned index structures. The required poisoning approach is different from all previous works since the model under attack is trained on a cumulative distribution function (CDF) and, thus, every injection on the training set has a cascading impact on multiple data values. We formulate the first poisoning attacks on linear regression models trained on the CDF, which is a basic building block of the proposed learned index structures. We generalize our poisoning techniques to attack a more advanced two-stage design of learned index structures called recursive model index (RMI), which has been shown to outperform traditional B-Trees. We evaluate our attacks on real-world and synthetic datasets under a wide variety of parameterizations of the model and show that the error of the RMI increases up to $300\times$ and the error of its second-stage models increases up to $3000\times$.
Abstract:We formulate and study a fundamental search and detection problem, Schedule Optimization, motivated by a variety of real-world applications, ranging from monitoring content changes on the web, social networks, and user activities to detecting failure on large systems with many individual machines. We consider a large system consists of many nodes, where each node has its own rate of generating new events, or items. A monitoring application can probe a small number of nodes at each step, and our goal is to compute a probing schedule that minimizes the expected number of undiscovered items at the system, or equivalently, minimizes the expected time to discover a new item in the system. We study the Schedule Optimization problem both for deterministic and randomized memoryless algorithms. We provide lower bounds on the cost of an optimal schedule and construct close to optimal schedules with rigorous mathematical guarantees. Finally, we present an adaptive algorithm that starts with no prior information on the system and converges to the optimal memoryless algorithms by adapting to observed data.