Comparative Analysis of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Policies for Crop Planning Decision Support

In India, the majority of farmers are classified as small or marginal, making their livelihoods particularly vulnerable to economic losses due to market saturation and climate risks. Effective crop planning can significantly impact their expected income, yet existing decision support systems (DSS) often provide generic recommendations that fail to account for real-time market dynamics and the interactions among multiple farmers. In this paper, we evaluate the viability of three multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) approaches for optimizing total farmer income and promoting fairness in crop planning: Independent Q-Learning (IQL), where each farmer acts independently without coordination, Agent-by-Agent (ABA), which sequentially optimizes each farmer's policy in relation to the others, and the Multi-agent Rollout Policy, which jointly optimizes all farmers' actions for global reward maximization. Our results demonstrate that while IQL offers computational efficiency with linear runtime, it struggles with coordination among agents, leading to lower total rewards and an unequal distribution of income. Conversely, the Multi-agent Rollout policy achieves the highest total rewards and promotes equitable income distribution among farmers but requires significantly more computational resources, making it less practical for large numbers of agents. ABA strikes a balance between runtime efficiency and reward optimization, offering reasonable total rewards with acceptable fairness and scalability. These findings highlight the importance of selecting appropriate MARL approaches in DSS to provide personalized and equitable crop planning recommendations, advancing the development of more adaptive and farmer-centric agricultural decision-making systems.

Targets in Reinforcement Learning to solve Stackelberg Security Games

Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms have been successfully applied to real world situations like illegal smuggling, poaching, deforestation, climate change, airport security, etc. These scenarios can be framed as Stackelberg security games (SSGs) where defenders and attackers compete to control target resources. The algorithm's competency is assessed by which agent is controlling the targets. This review investigates modeling of SSGs in RL with a focus on possible improvements of target representations in RL algorithms.