Adversarial Attacks Beyond the Image Space

Generating adversarial examples is an intriguing problem and an important way of understanding the working mechanism of deep neural networks. Most existing approaches generated perturbations in the image space, i.e., each pixel can be modified independently. However, in this paper we pay special attention to the subset of adversarial examples that are physically authentic -- those corresponding to actual changes in 3D physical properties (like surface normals, illumination condition, etc.). These adversaries arguably pose a more serious concern, as they demonstrate the possibility of causing neural network failure by small perturbations of real-world 3D objects and scenes. In the contexts of object classification and visual question answering, we augment state-of-the-art deep neural networks that receive 2D input images with a rendering module (either differentiable or not) in front, so that a 3D scene (in the physical space) is rendered into a 2D image (in the image space), and then mapped to a prediction (in the output space). The adversarial perturbations can now go beyond the image space, and have clear meanings in the 3D physical world. Through extensive experiments, we found that a vast majority of image-space adversaries cannot be explained by adjusting parameters in the physical space, i.e., they are usually physically inauthentic. But it is still possible to successfully attack beyond the image space on the physical space (such that authenticity is enforced), though this is more difficult than image-space attacks, reflected in lower success rates and heavier perturbations required.