From Relative Entropy to Minimax: A Unified Framework for Coverage in MDPs

Targeted and deliberate exploration of state--action pairs is essential in reward-free Markov Decision Problems (MDPs). More precisely, different state-action pairs exhibit different degree of importance or difficulty which must be actively and explicitly built into a controlled exploration strategy. To this end, we propose a weighted and parameterized family of concave coverage objectives, denoted by $U_ρ$, defined directly over state--action occupancy measures. This family unifies several widely studied objectives within a single framework, including divergence-based marginal matching, weighted average coverage, and worst-case (minimax) coverage. While the concavity of $U_ρ$ captures the diminishing return associated with over-exploration, the simple closed form of the gradient of $U_ρ$ enables an explicit control to prioritize under-explored state--action pairs. Leveraging this structure, we develop a gradient-based algorithm that actively steers the induced occupancy toward a desired coverage pattern. Moreover, we show that as $ρ$ increases, the resulting exploration strategy increasingly emphasizes the least-explored state--action pairs, recovering worst-case coverage behavior in the limit.

Trojan Cleansing with Neural Collapse

Trojan attacks are sophisticated training-time attacks on neural networks that embed backdoor triggers which force the network to produce a specific output on any input which includes the trigger. With the increasing relevance of deep networks which are too large to train with personal resources and which are trained on data too large to thoroughly audit, these training-time attacks pose a significant risk. In this work, we connect trojan attacks to Neural Collapse, a phenomenon wherein the final feature representations of over-parameterized neural networks converge to a simple geometric structure. We provide experimental evidence that trojan attacks disrupt this convergence for a variety of datasets and architectures. We then use this disruption to design a lightweight, broadly generalizable mechanism for cleansing trojan attacks from a wide variety of different network architectures and experimentally demonstrate its efficacy.