On the Robustness of Kolmogorov-Arnold Networks: An Adversarial Perspective

Kolmogorov-Arnold Networks (KANs) have recently emerged as a novel approach to function approximation, demonstrating remarkable potential in various domains. Despite their theoretical promise, the robustness of KANs under adversarial conditions has yet to be thoroughly examined. In this paper, we explore the adversarial robustness of KANs, with a particular focus on image classification tasks. We assess the performance of KANs against standard white-box adversarial attacks, comparing their resilience to that of established neural network architectures. Further, we investigate the transferability of adversarial examples between KANs and Multilayer Perceptron (MLPs), deriving critical insights into the unique vulnerabilities of KANs. Our experiments use the MNIST, FashionMNIST, and KMNIST datasets, providing a comprehensive evaluation of KANs in adversarial scenarios. This work offers the first in-depth analysis of security in KANs, laying the groundwork for future research in this emerging field.

Fortify the Guardian, Not the Treasure: Resilient Adversarial Detectors

This paper presents RADAR-Robust Adversarial Detection via Adversarial Retraining-an approach designed to enhance the robustness of adversarial detectors against adaptive attacks, while maintaining classifier performance. An adaptive attack is one where the attacker is aware of the defenses and adapts their strategy accordingly. Our proposed method leverages adversarial training to reinforce the ability to detect attacks, without compromising clean accuracy. During the training phase, we integrate into the dataset adversarial examples, which were optimized to fool both the classifier and the adversarial detector, enabling the adversarial detector to learn and adapt to potential attack scenarios. Experimental evaluations on the CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets demonstrate that our proposed algorithm significantly improves a detector's ability to accurately identify adaptive adversarial attacks -- without sacrificing clean accuracy.

XAI-Based Detection of Adversarial Attacks on Deepfake Detectors

We introduce a novel methodology for identifying adversarial attacks on deepfake detectors using eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). In an era characterized by digital advancement, deepfakes have emerged as a potent tool, creating a demand for efficient detection systems. However, these systems are frequently targeted by adversarial attacks that inhibit their performance. We address this gap, developing a defensible deepfake detector by leveraging the power of XAI. The proposed methodology uses XAI to generate interpretability maps for a given method, providing explicit visualizations of decision-making factors within the AI models. We subsequently employ a pretrained feature extractor that processes both the input image and its corresponding XAI image. The feature embeddings extracted from this process are then used for training a simple yet effective classifier. Our approach contributes not only to the detection of deepfakes but also enhances the understanding of possible adversarial attacks, pinpointing potential vulnerabilities. Furthermore, this approach does not change the performance of the deepfake detector. The paper demonstrates promising results suggesting a potential pathway for future deepfake detection mechanisms. We believe this study will serve as a valuable contribution to the community, sparking much-needed discourse on safeguarding deepfake detectors.

Open Sesame! Universal Black Box Jailbreaking of Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs), designed to provide helpful and safe responses, often rely on alignment techniques to align with user intent and social guidelines. Unfortunately, this alignment can be exploited by malicious actors seeking to manipulate an LLM's outputs for unintended purposes. In this paper we introduce a novel approach that employs a genetic algorithm (GA) to manipulate LLMs when model architecture and parameters are inaccessible. The GA attack works by optimizing a universal adversarial prompt that -- when combined with a user's query -- disrupts the attacked model's alignment, resulting in unintended and potentially harmful outputs. Our novel approach systematically reveals a model's limitations and vulnerabilities by uncovering instances where its responses deviate from expected behavior. Through extensive experiments we demonstrate the efficacy of our technique, thus contributing to the ongoing discussion on responsible AI development by providing a diagnostic tool for evaluating and enhancing alignment of LLMs with human intent. To our knowledge this is the first automated universal black box jailbreak attack.

I See Dead People: Gray-Box Adversarial Attack on Image-To-Text Models

Modern image-to-text systems typically adopt the encoder-decoder framework, which comprises two main components: an image encoder, responsible for extracting image features, and a transformer-based decoder, used for generating captions. Taking inspiration from the analysis of neural networks' robustness against adversarial perturbations, we propose a novel gray-box algorithm for creating adversarial examples in image-to-text models. Unlike image classification tasks that have a finite set of class labels, finding visually similar adversarial examples in an image-to-text task poses greater challenges because the captioning system allows for a virtually infinite space of possible captions. In this paper, we present a gray-box adversarial attack on image-to-text, both untargeted and targeted. We formulate the process of discovering adversarial perturbations as an optimization problem that uses only the image-encoder component, meaning the proposed attack is language-model agnostic. Through experiments conducted on the ViT-GPT2 model, which is the most-used image-to-text model in Hugging Face, and the Flickr30k dataset, we demonstrate that our proposed attack successfully generates visually similar adversarial examples, both with untargeted and targeted captions. Notably, our attack operates in a gray-box manner, requiring no knowledge about the decoder module. We also show that our attacks fool the popular open-source platform Hugging Face.

A Melting Pot of Evolution and Learning

We survey eight recent works by our group, involving the successful blending of evolutionary algorithms with machine learning and deep learning: 1. Binary and Multinomial Classification through Evolutionary Symbolic Regression, 2. Classy Ensemble: A Novel Ensemble Algorithm for Classification, 3. EC-KitY: Evolutionary Computation Tool Kit in Python, 4. Evolution of Activation Functions for Deep Learning-Based Image Classification, 5. Adaptive Combination of a Genetic Algorithm and Novelty Search for Deep Neuroevolution, 6. An Evolutionary, Gradient-Free, Query-Efficient, Black-Box Algorithm for Generating Adversarial Instances in Deep Networks, 7. Foiling Explanations in Deep Neural Networks, 8. Patch of Invisibility: Naturalistic Black-Box Adversarial Attacks on Object Detectors.

Patch of Invisibility: Naturalistic Black-Box Adversarial Attacks on Object Detectors

Adversarial attacks on deep-learning models have been receiving increased attention in recent years. Work in this area has mostly focused on gradient-based techniques, so-called white-box attacks, wherein the attacker has access to the targeted model's internal parameters; such an assumption is usually unrealistic in the real world. Some attacks additionally use the entire pixel space to fool a given model, which is neither practical nor physical (i.e., real-world). On the contrary, we propose herein a gradient-free method that uses the learned image manifold of a pretrained generative adversarial network (GAN) to generate naturalistic physical adversarial patches for object detectors. We show that our proposed method works both digitally and physically.

Foiling Explanations in Deep Neural Networks

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have greatly impacted numerous fields over the past decade. Yet despite exhibiting superb performance over many problems, their black-box nature still poses a significant challenge with respect to explainability. Indeed, explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is crucial in several fields, wherein the answer alone -- sans a reasoning of how said answer was derived -- is of little value. This paper uncovers a troubling property of explanation methods for image-based DNNs: by making small visual changes to the input image -- hardly influencing the network's output -- we demonstrate how explanations may be arbitrarily manipulated through the use of evolution strategies. Our novel algorithm, AttaXAI, a model-agnostic, adversarial attack on XAI algorithms, only requires access to the output logits of a classifier and to the explanation map; these weak assumptions render our approach highly useful where real-world models and data are concerned. We compare our method's performance on two benchmark datasets -- CIFAR100 and ImageNet -- using four different pretrained deep-learning models: VGG16-CIFAR100, VGG16-ImageNet, MobileNet-CIFAR100, and Inception-v3-ImageNet. We find that the XAI methods can be manipulated without the use of gradients or other model internals. Our novel algorithm is successfully able to manipulate an image in a manner imperceptible to the human eye, such that the XAI method outputs a specific explanation map. To our knowledge, this is the first such method in a black-box setting, and we believe it has significant value where explainability is desired, required, or legally mandatory.

Attackar: Attack of the Evolutionary Adversary

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are sensitive to adversarial data in a variety of scenarios, including the black-box scenario, where the attacker is only allowed to query the trained model and receive an output. Existing black-box methods for creating adversarial instances are costly, often using gradient estimation or training a replacement network. This paper introduces \textit{Attackar}, an evolutionary, score-based, black-box attack. Attackar is based on a novel objective function that can be used in gradient-free optimization problems. The attack only requires access to the output logits of the classifier and is thus not affected by gradient masking. No additional information is needed, rendering our method more suitable to real-life situations. We test its performance with three different state-of-the-art models -- Inception-v3, ResNet-50, and VGG-16-BN -- against three benchmark datasets: MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet. Furthermore, we evaluate Attackar's performance on non-differential transformation defenses and state-of-the-art robust models. Our results demonstrate the superior performance of Attackar, both in terms of accuracy score and query efficiency.

Evolution of Activation Functions for Deep Learning-Based Image Classification

Activation functions (AFs) play a pivotal role in the performance of neural networks. The Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) is currently the most commonly used AF. Several replacements to ReLU have been suggested but improvements have proven inconsistent. Some AFs exhibit better performance for specific tasks, but it is hard to know a priori how to select the appropriate one(s). Studying both standard fully connected neural networks (FCNs) and convolutional neural networks (CNNs), we propose a novel, three-population, coevolutionary algorithm to evolve AFs, and compare it to four other methods, both evolutionary and non-evolutionary. Tested on four datasets -- MNIST, FashionMNIST, KMNIST, and USPS -- coevolution proves to be a performant algorithm for finding good AFs and AF architectures.