Abstract:Although experience sharing (ES) accelerates multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) in an advisor-advisee framework, attempts to apply ES to decentralized multiagent systems have so far relied on trusted environments and overlooked the possibility of adversarial manipulation and inference. Nevertheless, in a real-world setting, some Byzantine attackers, disguised as advisors, may provide false advice to the advisee and catastrophically degrade the overall learning performance. Also, an inference attacker, disguised as an advisee, may conduct several queries to infer the advisors' private information and make the entire ES process questionable in terms of privacy leakage. To address and tackle these issues, we propose a novel MARL framework (BRNES) that heuristically selects a dynamic neighbor zone for each advisee at each learning step and adopts a weighted experience aggregation technique to reduce Byzantine attack impact. Furthermore, to keep the agent's private information safe from adversarial inference attacks, we leverage the local differential privacy (LDP)-induced noise during the ES process. Our experiments show that our framework outperforms the state-of-the-art in terms of the steps to goal, obtained reward, and time to goal metrics. Particularly, our evaluation shows that the proposed framework is 8.32x faster than the current non-private frameworks and 1.41x faster than the private frameworks in an adversarial setting.
Abstract:Lately, differential privacy (DP) has been introduced in cooperative multiagent reinforcement learning (CMARL) to safeguard the agents' privacy against adversarial inference during knowledge sharing. Nevertheless, we argue that the noise introduced by DP mechanisms may inadvertently give rise to a novel poisoning threat, specifically in the context of private knowledge sharing during CMARL, which remains unexplored in the literature. To address this shortcoming, we present an adaptive, privacy-exploiting, and evasion-resilient localized poisoning attack (PeLPA) that capitalizes on the inherent DP-noise to circumvent anomaly detection systems and hinder the optimal convergence of the CMARL model. We rigorously evaluate our proposed PeLPA attack in diverse environments, encompassing both non-adversarial and multiple-adversarial contexts. Our findings reveal that, in a medium-scale environment, the PeLPA attack with attacker ratios of 20% and 40% can lead to an increase in average steps to goal by 50.69% and 64.41%, respectively. Furthermore, under similar conditions, PeLPA can result in a 1.4x and 1.6x computational time increase in optimal reward attainment and a 1.18x and 1.38x slower convergence for attacker ratios of 20% and 40%, respectively.