Towards A Correct Usage of Cryptography in Semantic Watermarks for Diffusion Models

Semantic watermarking methods enable the direct integration of watermarks into the generation process of latent diffusion models by only modifying the initial latent noise. One line of approaches building on Gaussian Shading relies on cryptographic primitives to steer the sampling process of the latent noise. However, we identify several issues in the usage of cryptographic techniques in Gaussian Shading, particularly in its proof of lossless performance and key management, causing ambiguity in follow-up works, too. In this work, we therefore revisit the cryptographic primitives for semantic watermarking. We introduce a novel, general proof of lossless performance based on IND\$-CPA security for semantic watermarks. We then discuss the configuration of the cryptographic primitives in semantic watermarks with respect to security, efficiency, and generation quality.

Black-Box Forgery Attacks on Semantic Watermarks for Diffusion Models

Integrating watermarking into the generation process of latent diffusion models (LDMs) simplifies detection and attribution of generated content. Semantic watermarks, such as Tree-Rings and Gaussian Shading, represent a novel class of watermarking techniques that are easy to implement and highly robust against various perturbations. However, our work demonstrates a fundamental security vulnerability of semantic watermarks. We show that attackers can leverage unrelated models, even with different latent spaces and architectures (UNet vs DiT), to perform powerful and realistic forgery attacks. Specifically, we design two watermark forgery attacks. The first imprints a targeted watermark into real images by manipulating the latent representation of an arbitrary image in an unrelated LDM to get closer to the latent representation of a watermarked image. We also show that this technique can be used for watermark removal. The second attack generates new images with the target watermark by inverting a watermarked image and re-generating it with an arbitrary prompt. Both attacks just need a single reference image with the target watermark. Overall, our findings question the applicability of semantic watermarks by revealing that attackers can easily forge or remove these watermarks under realistic conditions.