A Generalized Model for Multidimensional Intransitivity

Intransitivity is a critical issue in pairwise preference modeling. It refers to the intransitive pairwise preferences between a group of players or objects that potentially form a cyclic preference chain and has been long discussed in social choice theory in the context of the dominance relationship. However, such multifaceted intransitivity between players and the corresponding player representations in high dimensions is difficult to capture. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic model that jointly learns each player's d-dimensional representation (d>1) and a dataset-specific metric space that systematically captures the distance metric in Rd over the embedding space. Interestingly, by imposing additional constraints in the metric space, our proposed model degenerates to former models used in intransitive representation learning. Moreover, we present an extensive quantitative investigation of the vast existence of intransitive relationships between objects in various real-world benchmark datasets. To our knowledge, this investigation is the first of this type. The predictive performance of our proposed method on different real-world datasets, including social choice, election, and online game datasets, shows that our proposed method outperforms several competing methods in terms of prediction accuracy.

VickreyFeedback: Cost-efficient Data Construction for Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback

This paper addresses the cost-efficiency aspect of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). RLHF leverages datasets of human preferences over outputs of large language models (LLM) to instill human expectations into LLMs. While preference annotation comes with a monetized cost, the economic utility of a preference dataset has not been considered by far. What exacerbates this situation is that given complex intransitive or cyclic relationships in preference datasets, existing algorithms for fine-tuning LLMs are still far from capturing comprehensive preferences. This raises severe cost-efficiency concerns in production environments, where preference data accumulate over time. In this paper, we see the fine-tuning of LLMs as a monetized economy and introduce an auction mechanism to improve the efficiency of the preference data collection in dollar terms. We show that introducing an auction mechanism can play an essential role in enhancing the cost-efficiency of RLHF while maintaining satisfactory model performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed auction-based protocol is cost-efficient for fine-tuning LLMs by concentrating on high-quality feedback.