Abstract:Given the remarkable capabilities of large language models (LLMs), there has been a growing interest in evaluating their similarity to the human brain. One approach towards quantifying this similarity is by measuring how well a model predicts neural signals, also called "brain score". Internal representations from LLMs achieve state-of-the-art brain scores, leading to speculation that they share computational principles with human language processing. This inference is only valid if the subset of neural activity predicted by LLMs reflects core elements of language processing. Here, we question this assumption by analyzing three neural datasets used in an impactful study on LLM-to-brain mappings, with a particular focus on an fMRI dataset where participants read short passages. We first find that when using shuffled train-test splits, as done in previous studies with these datasets, a trivial feature that encodes temporal autocorrelation not only outperforms LLMs but also accounts for the majority of neural variance that LLMs explain. We therefore use contiguous splits moving forward. Second, we explain the surprisingly high brain scores of untrained LLMs by showing they do not account for additional neural variance beyond two simple features: sentence length and sentence position. This undermines evidence used to claim that the transformer architecture biases computations to be more brain-like. Third, we find that brain scores of trained LLMs on this dataset can largely be explained by sentence length, position, and pronoun-dereferenced static word embeddings; a small, additional amount is explained by sense-specific embeddings and contextual representations of sentence structure. We conclude that over-reliance on brain scores can lead to over-interpretations of similarity between LLMs and brains, and emphasize the importance of deconstructing what LLMs are mapping to in neural signals.
Abstract:Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.