Abstract:Measuring perceptual similarity is a key tool in computer vision. In recent years perceptual metrics based on features extracted from neural networks with large and diverse training sets, e.g. CLIP, have become popular. At the same time, the metrics extracted from features of neural networks are not adversarially robust. In this paper we show that adversarially robust CLIP models, called R-CLIP$_\textrm{F}$, obtained by unsupervised adversarial fine-tuning induce a better and adversarially robust perceptual metric that outperforms existing metrics in a zero-shot setting, and further matches the performance of state-of-the-art metrics while being robust after fine-tuning. Moreover, our perceptual metric achieves strong performance on related tasks such as robust image-to-image retrieval, which becomes especially relevant when applied to "Not Safe for Work" (NSFW) content detection and dataset filtering. While standard perceptual metrics can be easily attacked by a small perturbation completely degrading NSFW detection, our robust perceptual metric maintains high accuracy under an attack while having similar performance for unperturbed images. Finally, perceptual metrics induced by robust CLIP models have higher interpretability: feature inversion can show which images are considered similar, while text inversion can find what images are associated to a given prompt. This also allows us to visualize the very rich visual concepts learned by a CLIP model, including memorized persons, paintings and complex queries.
Abstract:Multi-modal foundation models like OpenFlamingo, LLaVA, and GPT-4 are increasingly used for various real-world tasks. Prior work has shown that these models are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks on the vision modality. These attacks can be leveraged to spread fake information or defraud users, and thus pose a significant risk, which makes the robustness of large multi-modal foundation models a pressing problem. The CLIP model, or one of its variants, is used as a frozen vision encoder in many vision-language models (VLMs), e.g. LLaVA and OpenFlamingo. We propose an unsupervised adversarial fine-tuning scheme to obtain a robust CLIP vision encoder, which yields robustness on all vision down-stream tasks (VLMs, zero-shot classification) that rely on CLIP. In particular, we show that stealth-attacks on users of VLMs by a malicious third party providing manipulated images are no longer possible once one replaces the original CLIP model with our robust one. No retraining or fine-tuning of the VLM is required. The code and robust models are available at https://github.com/chs20/RobustVLM
Abstract:Multi-modal foundation models combining vision and language models such as Flamingo or GPT-4 have recently gained enormous interest. Alignment of foundation models is used to prevent models from providing toxic or harmful output. While malicious users have successfully tried to jailbreak foundation models, an equally important question is if honest users could be harmed by malicious third-party content. In this paper we show that imperceivable attacks on images in order to change the caption output of a multi-modal foundation model can be used by malicious content providers to harm honest users e.g. by guiding them to malicious websites or broadcast fake information. This indicates that countermeasures to adversarial attacks should be used by any deployed multi-modal foundation model.