Transfer adversarial attacks raise critical security concerns in real-world, black-box scenarios. However, the actual progress of attack methods is difficult to assess due to two main limitations in existing evaluations. First, existing evaluations are unsystematic and sometimes unfair since new methods are often directly added to old ones without complete comparisons to similar methods. Second, existing evaluations mainly focus on transferability but overlook another key attack property: stealthiness. In this work, we design good practices to address these limitations. We first introduce a new attack categorization, which enables our systematic analyses of similar attacks in each specific category. Our analyses lead to new findings that complement or even challenge existing knowledge. Furthermore, we comprehensively evaluate 23 representative attacks against 9 defenses on ImageNet. We pay particular attention to stealthiness, by adopting diverse imperceptibility metrics and looking into new, finer-grained characteristics. Our evaluation reveals new important insights: 1) Transferability is highly contextual, and some white-box defenses may give a false sense of security since they are actually vulnerable to (black-box) transfer attacks; 2) All transfer attacks are less stealthy, and their stealthiness can vary dramatically under the same $L_{\infty}$ bound.