Information Leakage Detection through Approximate Bayes-optimal Prediction

In today's data-driven world, the proliferation of publicly available information intensifies the challenge of information leakage (IL), raising security concerns. IL involves unintentionally exposing secret (sensitive) information to unauthorized parties via systems' observable information. Conventional statistical approaches, which estimate mutual information (MI) between observable and secret information for detecting IL, face challenges such as the curse of dimensionality, convergence, computational complexity, and MI misestimation. Furthermore, emerging supervised machine learning (ML) methods, though effective, are limited to binary system-sensitive information and lack a comprehensive theoretical framework. To address these limitations, we establish a theoretical framework using statistical learning theory and information theory to accurately quantify and detect IL. We demonstrate that MI can be accurately estimated by approximating the log-loss and accuracy of the Bayes predictor. As the Bayes predictor is typically unknown in practice, we propose to approximate it with the help of automated machine learning (AutoML). First, we compare our MI estimation approaches against current baselines, using synthetic data sets generated using the multivariate normal (MVN) distribution with known MI. Second, we introduce a cut-off technique using one-sided statistical tests to detect IL, employing the Holm-Bonferroni correction to increase confidence in detection decisions. Our study evaluates IL detection performance on real-world data sets, highlighting the effectiveness of the Bayes predictor's log-loss estimation, and finds our proposed method to effectively estimate MI on synthetic data sets and thus detect ILs accurately.