Incentivizing Truthful Collaboration in Heterogeneous Federated Learning

It is well-known that Federated Learning (FL) is vulnerable to manipulated updates from clients. In this work we study the impact of data heterogeneity on clients' incentives to manipulate their updates. We formulate a game in which clients may upscale their gradient updates in order to ``steer'' the server model to their advantage. We develop a payment rule that disincentivizes sending large gradient updates, and steers the clients towards truthfully reporting their gradients. We also derive explicit bounds on the clients' payments and the convergence rate of the global model, which allows us to study the trade-off between heterogeneity, payments and convergence.

Simplicity Bias of Two-Layer Networks beyond Linearly Separable Data

Simplicity bias, the propensity of deep models to over-rely on simple features, has been identified as a potential reason for limited out-of-distribution generalization of neural networks (Shah et al., 2020). Despite the important implications, this phenomenon has been theoretically confirmed and characterized only under strong dataset assumptions, such as linear separability (Lyu et al., 2021). In this work, we characterize simplicity bias for general datasets in the context of two-layer neural networks initialized with small weights and trained with gradient flow. Specifically, we prove that in the early training phases, network features cluster around a few directions that do not depend on the size of the hidden layer. Furthermore, for datasets with an XOR-like pattern, we precisely identify the learned features and demonstrate that simplicity bias intensifies during later training stages. These results indicate that features learned in the middle stages of training may be more useful for OOD transfer. We support this hypothesis with experiments on image data.

Provable Mutual Benefits from Federated Learning in Privacy-Sensitive Domains

Cross-silo federated learning (FL) allows data owners to train accurate machine learning models by benefiting from each others private datasets. Unfortunately, the model accuracy benefits of collaboration are often undermined by privacy defenses. Therefore, to incentivize client participation in privacy-sensitive domains, a FL protocol should strike a delicate balance between privacy guarantees and end-model accuracy. In this paper, we study the question of when and how a server could design a FL protocol provably beneficial for all participants. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of mutually beneficial protocols in the context of mean estimation and convex stochastic optimization. We also derive protocols that maximize the total clients' utility, given symmetric privacy preferences. Finally, we design protocols maximizing end-model accuracy and demonstrate their benefits in synthetic experiments.

Strategic Data Sharing between Competitors

Collaborative learning techniques have significantly advanced in recent years, enabling private model training across multiple organizations. Despite this opportunity, firms face a dilemma when considering data sharing with competitors -- while collaboration can improve a company's machine learning model, it may also benefit competitors and hence reduce profits. In this work, we introduce a general framework for analyzing this data-sharing trade-off. The framework consists of three components, representing the firms' production decisions, the effect of additional data on model quality, and the data-sharing negotiation process, respectively. We then study an instantiation of the framework, based on a conventional market model from economic theory, to identify key factors that affect collaboration incentives. Our findings indicate a profound impact of market conditions on the data-sharing incentives. In particular, we find that reduced competition, in terms of the similarities between the firms' products, and harder learning tasks foster collaboration.