Towards Propositional KLM-Style Defeasible Standpoint Logics

The KLM approach to defeasible reasoning introduces a weakened form of implication into classical logic. This allows one to incorporate exceptions to general rules into a logical system, and for old conclusions to be withdrawn upon learning new contradictory information. Standpoint logics are a group of logics, introduced to the field of Knowledge Representation in the last 5 years, which allow for multiple viewpoints to be integrated into the same ontology, even when certain viewpoints may hold contradicting beliefs. In this paper, we aim to integrate standpoints into KLM propositional logic in a restricted setting. We introduce the logical system of Defeasible Restricted Standpoint Logic (DRSL) and define its syntax and semantics. Specifically, we integrate ranked interpretations and standpoint structures, which provide the semantics for propositional KLM and propositional standpoint logic respectively, in order to introduce ranked standpoint structures for DRSL. Moreover, we extend the non-monotonic entailment relation of rational closure from the propositional KLM case to the DRSL case. The main contribution of this paper is to characterize rational closure for DRSL both algorithmically and semantically, showing that rational closure can be characterized through a single representative ranked standpoint structure. Finally, we conclude that the semantic and algorithmic characterizations of rational closure are equivalent, and that entailment-checking for DRSL under rational closure is in the same complexity class as entailment-checking for propositional KLM.

Non-monotonic Extensions to Formal Concept Analysis via Object Preferences

Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is an approach to creating a conceptual hierarchy in which a \textit{concept lattice} is generated from a \textit{formal context}. That is, a triple consisting of a set of objects, $G$, a set of attributes, $M$, and an incidence relation $I$ on $G \times M$. A \textit{concept} is then modelled as a pair consisting of a set of objects (the \textit{extent}), and a set of shared attributes (the \textit{intent}). Implications in FCA describe how one set of attributes follows from another. The semantics of these implications closely resemble that of logical consequence in classical logic. In that sense, it describes a monotonic conditional. The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we introduce a non-monotonic conditional between sets of attributes, which assumes a preference over the set of objects. We show that this conditional gives rise to a consequence relation that is consistent with the postulates for non-monotonicty proposed by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor (commonly referred to as the KLM postulates). We argue that our contribution establishes a strong characterisation of non-monotonicity in FCA. Typical concepts represent concepts where the intent aligns with expectations from the extent, allowing for an exception-tolerant view of concepts. To this end, we show that the set of all typical concepts is a meet semi-lattice of the original concept lattice. This notion of typical concepts is a further introduction of KLM-style typicality into FCA, and is foundational towards developing an algebraic structure representing a concept lattice of prototypical concepts.