On the Calibration of Epistemic Uncertainty: Principles, Paradoxes and Conflictual Loss

The calibration of predictive distributions has been widely studied in deep learning, but the same cannot be said about the more specific epistemic uncertainty as produced by Deep Ensembles, Bayesian Deep Networks, or Evidential Deep Networks. Although measurable, this form of uncertainty is difficult to calibrate on an objective basis as it depends on the prior for which a variety of choices exist. Nevertheless, epistemic uncertainty must in all cases satisfy two formal requirements: first, it must decrease when the training dataset gets larger and, second, it must increase when the model expressiveness grows. Despite these expectations, our experimental study shows that on several reference datasets and models, measures of epistemic uncertainty violate these requirements, sometimes presenting trends completely opposite to those expected. These paradoxes between expectation and reality raise the question of the true utility of epistemic uncertainty as estimated by these models. A formal argument suggests that this disagreement is due to a poor approximation of the posterior distribution rather than to a flaw in the measure itself. Based on this observation, we propose a regularization function for deep ensembles, called conflictual loss in line with the above requirements. We emphasize its strengths by showing experimentally that it restores both requirements of epistemic uncertainty, without sacrificing either the performance or the calibration of the deep ensembles.

The Epistemic Uncertainty Hole: an issue of Bayesian Neural Networks

Bayesian Deep Learning (BDL) gives access not only to aleatoric uncertainty, as standard neural networks already do, but also to epistemic uncertainty, a measure of confidence a model has in its own predictions. In this article, we show through experiments that the evolution of epistemic uncertainty metrics regarding the model size and the size of the training set, goes against theoretical expectations. More precisely, we observe that the epistemic uncertainty collapses literally in the presence of large models and sometimes also of little training data, while we expect the exact opposite behaviour. This phenomenon, which we call "epistemic uncertainty hole", is all the more problematic as it undermines the entire applicative potential of BDL, which is based precisely on the use of epistemic uncertainty. As an example, we evaluate the practical consequences of this uncertainty hole on one of the main applications of BDL, namely the detection of out-of-distribution samples