Bayesian Opponent Modeling in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games

In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing agents for such settings is to compute or approximate a relevant game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium and then follow the prescribed strategy. However, such a strategy ignores any observations of opponents' play, which may indicate shortcomings that can be exploited. We present an approach for opponent modeling in multiplayer imperfect-information games where we collect observations of opponents' play through repeated interactions. We run experiments against a wide variety of real opponents and exact Nash equilibrium strategies in three-player Kuhn poker and show that our algorithm significantly outperforms all of the agents, including the exact Nash equilibrium strategies.

Prediction of Bayesian Intervals for Tropical Storms

Building on recent research for prediction of hurricane trajectories using recurrent neural networks (RNNs), we have developed improved methods and generalized the approach to predict Bayesian intervals in addition to simple point estimates. Tropical storms are capable of causing severe damage, so accurately predicting their trajectories can bring significant benefits to cities and lives, especially as they grow more intense due to climate change effects. By implementing the Bayesian interval using dropout in an RNN, we improve the actionability of the predictions, for example by estimating the areas to evacuate in the landfall region. We used an RNN to predict the trajectory of the storms at 6-hour intervals. We used latitude, longitude, windspeed, and pressure features from a Statistical Hurricane Intensity Prediction Scheme (SHIPS) dataset of about 500 tropical storms in the Atlantic Ocean. Our results show how neural network dropout values affect predictions and intervals.

Most Important Fundamental Rule of Poker Strategy

Poker is a large complex game of imperfect information, which has been singled out as a major AI challenge problem. Recently there has been a series of breakthroughs culminating in agents that have successfully defeated the strongest human players in two-player no-limit Texas hold 'em. The strongest agents are based on algorithms for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies, which are stored in massive binary files and unintelligible to humans. A recent line of research has explored approaches for extrapolating knowledge from strong game-theoretic strategies that can be understood by humans. This would be useful when humans are the ultimate decision maker and allow humans to make better decisions from massive algorithmically-generated strategies. Using techniques from machine learning we have uncovered a new simple, fundamental rule of poker strategy that leads to a significant improvement in performance over the best prior rule and can also easily be applied by human players.