Steering CLIP's vision transformer with sparse autoencoders

While vision models are highly capable, their internal mechanisms remain poorly understood -- a challenge which sparse autoencoders (SAEs) have helped address in language, but which remains underexplored in vision. We address this gap by training SAEs on CLIP's vision transformer and uncover key differences between vision and language processing, including distinct sparsity patterns for SAEs trained across layers and token types. We then provide the first systematic analysis on the steerability of CLIP's vision transformer by introducing metrics to quantify how precisely SAE features can be steered to affect the model's output. We find that 10-15\% of neurons and features are steerable, with SAEs providing thousands more steerable features than the base model. Through targeted suppression of SAE features, we then demonstrate improved performance on three vision disentanglement tasks (CelebA, Waterbirds, and typographic attacks), finding optimal disentanglement in middle model layers, and achieving state-of-the-art performance on defense against typographic attacks.

SCAM: A Real-World Typographic Robustness Evaluation for Multimodal Foundation Models

Typographic attacks exploit the interplay between text and visual content in multimodal foundation models, causing misclassifications when misleading text is embedded within images. However, existing datasets are limited in size and diversity, making it difficult to study such vulnerabilities. In this paper, we introduce SCAM, the largest and most diverse dataset of real-world typographic attack images to date, containing 1,162 images across hundreds of object categories and attack words. Through extensive benchmarking of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) on SCAM, we demonstrate that typographic attacks significantly degrade performance, and identify that training data and model architecture influence the susceptibility to these attacks. Our findings reveal that typographic attacks persist in state-of-the-art Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) due to the choice of their vision encoder, though larger Large Language Models (LLMs) backbones help mitigate their vulnerability. Additionally, we demonstrate that synthetic attacks closely resemble real-world (handwritten) attacks, validating their use in research. Our work provides a comprehensive resource and empirical insights to facilitate future research toward robust and trustworthy multimodal AI systems. We publicly release the datasets introduced in this paper under https://huggingface.co/datasets/BLISS-e-V/SCAM, along with the code for evaluations at https://github.com/Bliss-e-V/SCAM.