A Computational Model of Representation Learning in the Brain Cortex, Integrating Unsupervised and Reinforcement Learning

A common view on the brain learning processes proposes that the three classic learning paradigms -- unsupervised, reinforcement, and supervised -- take place in respectively the cortex, the basal-ganglia, and the cerebellum. However, dopamine outbursts, usually assumed to encode reward, are not limited to the basal ganglia but also reach prefrontal, motor, and higher sensory cortices. We propose that in the cortex the same reward-based trial-and-error processes might support not only the acquisition of motor representations but also of sensory representations. In particular, reward signals might guide trial-and-error processes that mix with associative learning processes to support the acquisition of representations better serving downstream action selection. We tested the soundness of this hypothesis with a computational model that integrates unsupervised learning (Contrastive Divergence) and reinforcement learning (REINFORCE). The model was tested with a task requiring different responses to different visual images grouped in categories involving either colour, shape, or size. Results show that a balanced mix of unsupervised and reinforcement learning processes leads to the best performance. Indeed, excessive unsupervised learning tends to under-represent task-relevant features while excessive reinforcement learning tends to initially learn slowly and then to incur in local minima. These results stimulate future empirical studies on category learning directed to investigate similar effects in the extrastriate visual cortices. Moreover, they prompt further computational investigations directed to study the possible advantages of integrating unsupervised and reinforcement learning processes.

Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM): A Neuro-Inspired Computational Theory of Consciousness

Many theories, based on neuroscientific and psychological empirical evidence and on computational concepts, have been elaborated to explain the emergence of consciousness in the central nervous system. These theories propose key fundamental mechanisms to explain consciousness, but they only partially connect such mechanisms to the possible functional and adaptive role of consciousness. Recently, some cognitive and neuroscientific models try to solve this gap by linking consciousness to various aspects of goal-directed behaviour, the pivotal cognitive process that allows mammals to flexibly act in challenging environments. Here we propose the Representation Internal-Manipulation (RIM) theory of consciousness, a theory that links the main elements of consciousness theories to components and functions of goal-directed behaviour, ascribing a central role for consciousness to the goal-directed manipulation of internal representations. This manipulation relies on four specific computational operations to perform the flexible internal adaptation of all key elements of goal-directed computation, from the representations of objects to those of goals, actions, and plans. Finally, we propose the concept of `manipulation agency' relating the sense of agency to the internal manipulation of representations. This allows us to propose that the subjective experience of consciousness is associated to the human capacity to generate and control a simulated internal reality that is vividly perceived and felt through the same perceptual and emotional mechanisms used to tackle the external world.