Abstract:A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is proportional to the fraction of issues, where his preferences disagree with the decision. While an issue-by-issue vote by all voters would maximize social welfare, we are interested in how well the preferences of the population can be approximated by a small committee. We show that a k-sortition (a random committee of k voters with the majority vote within the committee) leads to an outcome within the factor 1+O(1/k) of the optimal social cost for any number of voters n, any number of issues $m$, and any preference profile. For a small number of issues m, the social cost can be made even closer to optimal by delegation procedures that weigh committee members according to their number of followers. However, for large m, we demonstrate that the k-sortition is the worst-case optimal rule within a broad family of committee-based rules that take into account metric information about the preference profile of the whole population.
Abstract:Machine Learning (ML) algorithms shape our lives. Banks use them to determine if we are good borrowers; IT companies delegate them recruitment decisions; police apply ML for crime-prediction, and judges base their verdicts on ML. However, real-world examples show that such automated decisions tend to discriminate protected groups. This generated a huge hype both in media and in the research community. Quite a few formal notions of fairness were proposed, which take a form of constraints a ``fair'' algorithm must satisfy. We focus on scenarios where fairness is imposed on a self-interested party (e.g., a bank that maximizes its revenue). We find that the disadvantaged protected group can be worse off after imposing a fairness constraint. We introduce a family of Welfare-Equalizing fairness constraints that equalize per-capita welfare of protected groups, and include Demographic Parity and Equal Opportunity as particular cases. In this family, we characterize conditions under which the fairness constraint helps the disadvantaged group. We also characterize the structure of the optimal Welfare-Equalizing classifier for the self-interested party, and provide an LP-based algorithm to compute it. Overall, our Welfare-Equalizing fairness approach provides a unified framework for discussing fairness in classification in the presence of a self-interested party.